Design and Architecture of Hardware-based Random Function Security Primitives by Tehranipoor, Fatemeh
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Doctoral Dissertations University of Connecticut Graduate School
8-1-2017
Design and Architecture of Hardware-based
Random Function Security Primitives
Fatemeh Tehranipoor
University of Connecticut - Storrs, fatemeh.tehranipoor@uconn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations
Recommended Citation
Tehranipoor, Fatemeh, "Design and Architecture of Hardware-based Random Function Security Primitives" (2017). Doctoral
Dissertations. 1512.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1512
Design and Architecture of Hardware-based
Random Function Security Primitives
Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Ph.D.
University of Connecticut, 2017
In recent years, security has grown into a critical issue in modern information
systems. Electronic hardware security, in particular, has emerged as one of the
most serious challenges due to electronic devices penetrating every aspect of our
society. Furthermore, due to the trend in globalization, system integrators have
had to deal with integrated circuit (IC)/intellectual property (IP) counterfeiting
more than ever. These counterfeit hardware issues counterfeit hardware that have
driven the need for more secure chip authentication, since traditional ID or key
storage have been demonstrated to be vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. In
addition, due to the need for highly secure electronic information systems, almost
every important and valuable document or piece of data is stored/transferred in
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some type of encrypted form to prevent attackers from compromising privacy or
stealing information for nefarious uses. High entropy random numbers from phys-
ical sources are a critical component in authentication and encryption processes
within secure systems. Secure encryption is dependent on sources of truly random
numbers for generating keys, and there is a need for an on chip random number
generator to achieve adequate security. Furthermore, the Internet of Things (IoT)
adopts a large number of these hardware based security and prevention solutions
in order to securely exchange data in resource-efficient manner. Note that due
to the nature of IoT systems, these networked devices are particularly vulnerable
to attacks that involve physical manipulations. In this work, we have developed
several methodologies of hardware based random functions in order to address
the issues and enhance the security and trust of ICs. The methodologies proposed
in this thesis include: a novel DRAM-based intrinsic Physical Unclonable Func-
tion (PUF) for system-level security and authentication along with analysis of the
impact of various environmental conditions, particularly silicon aging; a DRAM
remanence based True Random Number Generation (TRNG) to produce random
sequences with a very low-cost overhead; a DRAM TRNG model using its startup
value behavior for creating random bit streams; an efficient power-supply noise
based TRNG model for generating an infinite number of random bits which has
been evaluated as a cost effective technique; architectures and hardware security
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solutions for the Internet of Things (IoT) environment. Since IoT devices are
heavily resource-constrained, our proposed designs can alleviate the concerns and
issues of establishing trustworthy and secure systems in an efficient and low-cost
manner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As electronic devices become ubiquitous and more interconnected, people must
depend on Integrated Circuits (ICs) for the security of sensitive information. Pro-
viding this security relies on well-established primitives for key generation, data
confidentiality and integrity, authentication, identification bit commitment, etc.
Therefore, it is paramount for ICs to be able to perform operations and critical
tasks in a low-cost yet highly secure way. Unfortunately, the conventional ap-
proaches (e.g. digital signatures, encryption) suffer from various shortcomings;
they are very slow, expensive, and increasingly vulnerable to physical and side
channel attacks. Hardware-based security primitives such as physically unclon-
able functions (PUFs) and true random number generators (TRNGs) can over-
come these limitations and provide random functions in order to establish security
and trustworthiness in critical application and systems. PUFs can derive secrets
from the complex physical characteristics of ICs rather than storing the secrets in
digital memories. PUFs can significantly increase physical security by generating
1
2volatile secrets (keys) that only exist in a digital form when an IC is powered on
and operating. Furthermore, a TRNG is an important security primitive used in
a variety of applications including cryptographic algorithms, statistics, communi-
cation systems, simulations, etc. It is critical that a TRNG be able to produce
outputs consisting of fully unpredictable and unbiased bits in a cost-effective man-
ner. In general, these hardware security primitives should provide low-cost and
efficient trustworthiness of the physical hardware platforms. One should note
that while these primitives can provide advantages to ICs, there are properties
and details of the design that need to be considered (e.g. power usage, overhead,
heat).
Since the Internet of Things (IoT) is a rapidly emerging paradigm, the
most demanding requirement for their widespread realization is security. Apply-
ing low-cost security solutions to a large scale of IoT [88] and even Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPSs) [18] is possible using hardware-based security primitives such as
PUFs and TRNGs. Providing a secure framework and platform for IoT systems
can protect them against malicious attacks. One of the most challenging con-
cerns for developing secure IoT devices is the resource constrained nature of these
embedded systems. Security traditionally requires a great deal of resources in
order to perform the computations necessary for encryption, certificate verifica-
tion, third-party authentication, etc. By implementing the previously discussed
3hardware security primitives, developers can easily overcome the issues of resource
constrained IoT device trustworthiness and verifiability in a low-cost and efficient
way.
1.1 Security Vulnerabilities
In recent years, security has grown into a critical issue in modern information
systems. Electronic hardware security, in particular, has emerged as one of the
most serious challenges due to electronic devices penetrating every aspect of our
society. Due to globalization trends, intellectual property (IP) vendors and system
integrators have to deal with various counterfeiting issues more than ever and this
surge in counterfeit hardware has driven the need for more secure chip authentica-
tion. Among the sources of counterfeit chips are reintroduced discarded chips into
the supply chain and fabrication of cheap copies that pass as authentic without
significant scrutiny. Since the IP owner cannot be present during the fabrication
process, this makes Integrated Circuit (IC) designs increasingly vulnerable to ma-
licious modifications. In today’s technology-based day to day existence, there is a
need to maintain the privacy of users and their data. These efforts are necessary to
protect oneself against an unending tide of malicious activity and eavesdroppers.
To complete this task one requires large random bit strings of information that
can be applied for encoding, or decoding, sensitive information. The randomness
4of the bit strings used allows a user to counter the ability of an attacker to predict
the result of the data manipulation. Otherwise a nefarious individual would be
able to decrypt secure communications with minimal effort due to function-based
(e.g. time domain) knowledge. As a rule of thumb, the algorithms used to pro-
duce these random numbers must have fast speed, require low power to operate,
provide high reliability, and have high entropy.
1.2 Hardware Security Primitives
Traditional mathematical cryptography methods relies on the existence of one or
more pieces of secret information (keys) to perform a secret exchange of infor-
mation. The mathematical properties of the cryptographic algorithms ensure the
infeasibility of mathematical attacks on the ciphers. However, these algorithms
depend on the secure storage of these secret keys. With the ubiquitous deployment
of cryptographic hardware and software secret storage of keys is not guaranteed
because of the ability to easily attack non-volatile storage such as flash. Thus,
alternative cryptographic protocols based on hardware security primitives that do
not require an explicit secret key storage.
51.2.1 Physical Unclonable Functions
As a means to uniquely identify chips, researchers have proposed using the random
process variations that naturally occur during the manufacturing process. These
effects include process variations such as the size of transistors, capacitors, resis-
tors and other components. These are unavoidable for the most part, and must be
accounted during the design and layout process. However, these random process
variations can be used to our advantage if we use them to generate unique intrin-
sic identifiers. This is the idea behind Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs),
which was first proposed by Gassend et al. in 2002 [29]. Gassend and Pappu in
2001 developed the first silicon PUFs through the use of intrinsic process variation
in deep submicron integrated circuits. They used the intrinsic process variability
of silicon devices during manufacturing to produce unique, random and unclon-
able digital responses and called it a physically random function. They have since
been called physical unclonable function to emphasize the fact that they are not
repeatable. Generally speaking, PUFs should present unpredictable, robust and
unclonable characteristics. PUFs are circuits that have come into prominence in
the past decade and hold much promise as a hardware security primitive.
A PUF can provide a hardware specific unique signature or a ”fingerprint”
for an integrated circuit that can be leveraged for various security applications
including authentication and secure access. One strong characteristic of a PUF is
6that it can not be reverse engineered easily. There are two fundamental require-
ments for building a PUF: random and uncontrollable variations. The variations
must be random, thereby drastically reducing the probability that a unique sig-
nature will be repeated. Also, the variations must be uncontrollable such that an
adversary can not clone the devices. A PUFs inputs and outputs map a specific
set of challenges to a set of corresponding responses which are called Challenge-
Response Pairs (CRPs) [61]. In other words, a PUF is a multiple-input (chal-
lenges) multiple-output (responses) function that has hard-to-predict dependency
between the outputs and its inputs. The functional relationship between challenge
and response looks like that of a random function. Because the PUF is derived
from random process variation, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to predict the
responses from a particular challenge or construct a function to do so in hardware
or in software.
In general, a good PUF should have several parameters and characteristics,
in particular Uniqueness, Reliability, and Randomness. Uniqueness of a PUF
represents the ability of that PUF to uniquely generate responses. In other words,
PUF uniqueness means that different PUFs generate different responses for the
same challenge. Reliability of a PUF demonstrates that a given PUF can re-
generate the same response for a particular challenge consistently. Finally, the
randomness of a PUF indicates how random the response bits are. Ideally, the
7response should follow a uniform distribution, whereby the proportion of 0s and
1s in the response bits should be equal. Figure 1.1 shows a PUF-based secure
authentication technique. For simple IC authentication, PUF challenges (input)
- response (output) pairs are collected from each chip, and stored in a secure
database. In order to authenticate any given IC, one of the challenges is presented
to the IC, the PUF embedded in the IC generates a response. If the produced
response matches the one that is stored in the database, that means the IC is
authentic. Note that in order to prevent man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks, each
CRP (challenge-response pair) is used only once. An application for PUFs is that
they can be used to provide secure, safe and low-cost authentication by generating
unique secret keys/IDs. The ability of PUF devices to provide bit strings unique
to each component can be leveraged as an authentication mechanism to detect
tampering and attacks [16].
The advantage of using PUFs compared to traditional solutions is that they
are: highly secure and inexpensive, because they provide volatile secrets which do
not need to be stored anywhere and do not require any special fabrication technol-
ogy and manufacturing process. Since PUF application is typically characterized
by having two phases, enrollment and regeneration, it has the potential to be used
for authentication purpose easily.
8Fig. 1.1: Physical Unclonable Functions Secure Authentication Mechanism
1.2.2 Random Number Generations
Cryptography and security applications make extensive use of random numbers
and random bits. Random numbers are useful for a variety of purposes, such as
generating data encryption keys, simulating and modeling complex phenomena,
selecting random samples from larger data sets, and even for gambling. Ran-
dom number generators (RNGs) are classically divided into two different types:
Pseudo random number generators (PRNGs) and True random number generators
(TRNGs). PRNGs are deterministic in nature, but are traditionally adequate for
most applications. These type of random number generators usually require a seed
(i.e. number to initialize the internal state of the generator) and the seed should be
periodically changed to keep the system secure. The number sequence produced
by PRNGs is random within a specific time period; meaning the method of ran-
9dom number generation does not provide truly random behavior. TRNGs, on the
other hand, derive their randomness from a physical entropy source and provide
inherently nondeterministic behavior. They are unpredictable, and are random in
the entire time domain. Since TRNGs are capable of producing uncorrelated and
irreproducible procedures they act as a critical component within cryptographic
systems and applications. For security-centric applications the high entropy num-
bers from physical sources are a critical component in authentication and data
encryption processes, where they are used to generate random cryptographic keys
that are used to transmit data securely. Designing TRNGs around new forms of
noise, one must account for certain features. Ideal TRNGs should display three
essential characteristics: efficiency, non-determinism and non-periodicity. The dy-
namically natured variations that are induced by power supply noise exhibit the
necessary characteristics. A general schematic of a TRNG model is shown in 1.2.
One can see that the model has a physical random source. There is also a data
sampling module that can produce raw bits. If a user requires post-processing
(e.g. Von Neumann [44]) then the model can produce processed data, at the cost
of additional overhead to the model’s operation.
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Fig. 1.2: General schematic of a TRNG model.
1.2.3 Security Primitives Potential Application Areas
Establishing security across physical hardware platforms can be a resource inten-
sive and costly aspect when protecting the storage and exchange of data between
components. As discussed in previous sections, one can use these security prim-
itives for the purpose of securing physical objects to protect sensitive data and
functionality of a device from a malicious actor. PUFs allow for unique identity
to be attached to specific components or systems. This functionality provides
the ability to authenticate hardware by producing individual signatures (IDs)
for an implemented IC. It also can generate keys that can be used for encryp-
tion/decryption algorithms. This is possible since the randomness of the produced
IDs/keys are enough to be used for this purpose. As TRNGs are another security
primitive that are uniquely tailored to produce high random sequences of bits for a
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multitude of applications. These applications include: gaming, product labeling,
simulations, cryptography and etc. The reason that these security primitives are
widely adopted is they exploit the physical properties of a hardware system to
produce random output. Due to this popularity, these solutions have the poten-
tial to be used in securing IoT environments as long as their design is focused on
being low-cost and resource efficient.
1.3 Problem Statement
Reliability and uniqueness are always important issues that hinders PUFs prac-
tical applications. The stability of PUFs under various operating conditions has
been a serious concern facing different kinds of PUFs. Another largest problems
facing the continued use of hardware-based random functions (PUFs and RNGs)
is that as technology continues to grow, there is a high demand for low-cost re-
source efficient solutions. In order to overcome this potential future limitation, we
proposed novel designs and architectures for the improvement of hardware-based
random functions that meet the desired requirements of new embedded system
security needs. Our solutions to this problem, which we will talk about in the
following chapters, can be used to provide physical objects security in a variety of
different applications such as the Internet of Things.
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1.4 Related Works and Limitations
(1) PUFs: Since PUFs have gained considerable attention in the past few years, it
has yielded several proposed approaches for the realization of these functions. Fig-
ure 1.3 shows a comprehensive taxonomy of existing PUF types and categorization.
The two largest categories of PUFs are intrinsic and extrinsic. Extrinsic PUFs
rely on some external stimuli in order to generate CRPs, for example light for an
optical PUF. On the other hand, intrinsic PUFs are ones that depend on the nat-
ural internal manufacturing property (process variation) of the device. Examples
of intrinsic PUFs include delay based PUFs (arbiter PUF, RO PUF) which can
depend on digital race condition or frequency oscillation (delay), respectively [40].
So far, various kinds of PUFs have been proposed for key generation/ID, such as
RO-PUF [114], [60], [116], [111], [108], Arbiter PUF [94], Butterfly PUF [69], Clock
PUF [113], Controlled PUF [20], Rowhammer PUF [90], Memristor PUF [68], etc.
Many methods have already been proposed for identification and authentication of
ICs such as in [94], [73]. Of particular interest are memory-based PUFs, which are
attractive because most electronic systems have some type of memory included.
The limitations of PUFs are that most previous PUF designs suffer from adding
extra circuit to the existing hardware. However, memory-based PUF designs do
not need any extra circuitry to achieve reliable PUF IDs/keys. Memory-based
PUFs are usually based on the measurement of startup values of memory cells.
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Fig. 1.3: PUFs Taxonomy based on Origin of Stimulus.
Flash memory is a Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) that has been proposed as a
memory-based PUF in [102] and [77]. SRAM PUFs are one existing memory
based PUF which has been presented in [106], [76], [91], [41], [42]. A SRAM PUF
can generate a device-individual fingerprint using the startup behavior of its cells.
SRAM PUFs exploit the inherent threshold variation of the cross-coupled SRAM
cells. DRAM PUF is a newly presented work by Hashemian et al. [37], Keller
et al. [52], Sutar et al. [95], Xiong et al. [107], Liu et al. [57]. Researchers have
also proposed potential PUFs using future memory technologies such as memris-
tors [86], [53], spintronic memories [43], MRAM-based PUFs [98], [21], etc.
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(2) RNGs: Generally, PRNGs fit most of the application needs but there are
demanding situations where PRNGs are substituted by TRNGs and those are
the applications where it is important that the numbers be really unpredictable,
such as for data encryption, and generating cryptographic keys. The reason be-
ing the PRNGs lack of strong randomness properties [15], which can be seen via
various statistical tests. Hence, the output sequences from TRNGs should have
good statistical properties verified with the use of statistical tests, e.g. from NIST
800-22 statistical test suite [87]. However, the generation of true random bits is
problematic in many practical applications of cryptography. Currently, several
techniques are used for implementing TRNGs. In [12], Bruynincks et al. analyzed
the security requirements of TRNGs, demonstrated the real-life attacks performed
on various types of TRNGs and proposed solutions for generating safe cryptog-
raphy random bits using TRNGs from untrusted vendors. In [104], the authors
exploited random behavior from nearly-metastable operation of a group of FP-
GAs. An oscillator-based TRNG has been proposed in [3] that can automatically
adjusts the generated unbiased random numbers produced by process variation
and dynamic temperature. Mudit et al. proposed a TRNG design based around
sense amplifier circuits that are balanced in the metastable region using hot car-
rier injection in [9]. Recently, new TRNG models such as Technology Independent
(TI) TRNG, TRNG using hot-carrier injection balanced metastable sense ampli-
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fiers, Portable TRNG for personal encryption application based on smart phone
cameras, and Highly Efficient TRNG in FPGA Devices Using Phase-Locked Loops
are investigated in [81], [9], [115], and [22], respectively.
Various types of TRNGs have been proposed using different noise and ran-
dom sources such as ring oscillator (RO) TRNGs [24] [56] [82], memory based
TRNGs such as flash memory based [102] [19], SRAM-based TRNG [79], block
memory based TRNGs [33], metastability-based TRNGs [105], emerging device
noise based TRNGs [17] [38], etc. Some hardware-based TRNGs use high gain
amplifiers to enhance a noise source such that it can be discriminated by a com-
parator [75], [2]. Burleson et al. did some analysis of on-chip true random number
generators based on power supply variation [13].
The issue when examining the challenges of previous TRNG work is that
there is a clear line of acceptance between a working TRNG and a non-working
TRNG device. There is, however, a range of success for TRNG models that meet
the required standard. Some TRNGs have better results in terms of randomness
while others do not. The main challenge in TRNG research include low-cost design
that are robust against manipulation of environments (voltage and temperature)
and silicon aging. Our proposed TRNG models (DRAM remanence-based TRNG
(chapter 3) and Power supply-noise based TRNG (chapter 4)) have the advan-
tage of being very cost-effective and lightweight in terms of overhead. We have
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proposed a remanence based TRNG that has the advantage of being simplistic,
in that, our model does not need any extra hardware or overhead when compared
to existing solutions for TRNGs. Furthermore, our power supply noise-based has
the advantage of producing infinite number of random sequences.
1.5 Contributions
This thesis is devoted to the design and architecture of various hardware-based
random number function security primitives that meets the requirements and
needs for low-cost solutions in today’s electronic systems. Our work will also
deal with the architectural requirements for designing resource efficient embedded
system platforms. Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
1.5.1 PUF Design
We have developed new DRAM-based Physical Unclonable Functions using its
startup value behavior. Furthermore, we evaluated silicon aging effects on DRAM
PUFs reliability. Overall, developing PUF design for optimizing the use of existing
hardware resources for the purpose of creating random output was our goal.
1.5.2 RNG Design
We have developed random number generators particularly TRNGs based on ex-
isting memories (DRAM-based TRNG) and power supply-noise based true ran-
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dom number generator. Our goal while working on RNG-related projects was to
develop and introduce TRNG designs for the exploitation of the existing hardware
platform characteristics to generate highly random bit streams.
1.5.3 Primitive Designs in IoT Environment
After producing improved designs of our hardware-based random functions and
incredible results, we found that our developed solutions minimized additional cost
overhead and made optimal use of system resources. We noticed that the majority
of hardware-based random function solutions for distributed embedded systems
environment (i.e. IoT) were not designed to be low-cost and resource efficient.
We performed case studies to determine the effectiveness of our hardware security
primitive solutions in IoT healthcare domain and smart device authentication
(Smart DoorLock).
1.6 Thesis Outline
The outline of this thesis is as follows:
• Introduction
• DRAM-based Intrinsic Physically Unclonable Functions
• DRAM-based Random Number Generation Design
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• Power Supply Noise-based True Random Number Generation
• Hardware Security Architectures for the Internet of Things (IoT)
• Conclusions
Chapter 2
DRAM-based Intrinsic Physically Unclonable Functions
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce an intrinsic PUF based on dynamic random access
memories (DRAM). DRAM PUFs can be used in low cost identification appli-
cations and also have several advantages over other PUFs such as large input
patterns. The DRAM PUF relies on the fact that the capacitor in the DRAM
initializes to random values at startup. We demonstrate real DRAM PUFs and
describe an experimental setup to test different operating conditions on three
DRAMs to achieve the highest reliable results. Furthermore, we select the most
stable bits use as chip ID using our enrollment algorithm. We also evaluate silicon
aging effects on DRAM PUFs in details. In other words, we explore the possibil-
ity of intrinsic PUFs within Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) DRAM ICs. We
describe how to use the signatures to prevent modifications and uniquely identify
and/or authenticate electronic devices.
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2.2 Security Level Security
Most electronic systems are not designed with security in mind, as a result, there
are always threats from attackers to alter these systems and leak secret informa-
tion from them. Even if the systems are securely designed, there is no assurance
that the delivered system is authentic. System level security mechanisms can use
a subsystem on the board to prevent any altering or modification in system func-
tionality and stop or reset system if any anomalous behavior has been detected.
While it is difficult to authenticate the trustworthiness of any particular IC on
a system board, a unique identifier, such as a PUF embedded in an IC can be
used and gives the IC a unique identity. However, with COTS parts, a PUF or
chip ID may not be available, so mechanisms for intrinsic PUF identification are
needed. In this chapter, we present an intrinsic DRAM PUF that can be used to
authenticate electronic systems on which DRAMs are present.
2.3 DRAM PUF Description and Properties
PUFs intrinsic to DRAM ICs have not been explored extensively. Our primary
contribution is the identification of a DRAM PUF based on start up values. We
examine the effect of various operating conditions such as temperature variation,
voltage variation, and aging which may influence the behavior of the DRAM PUF.
Finally, we propose a selection mechanism to isolate highly stable bits within the
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large set of available bits in a DRAM.
2.3.1 DRAM PUF Advantages
DRAMs have some unique advantages that motivated us to explore it further:
1. Large input pattern: Because of the large number of available bits in a
typical DRAM, one can generate a large set of input challenges and cor-
respondingly large output responses. This characteristic of DRAM PUF is
very valuable which can make it to be distinct among all kinds of intrinsic
PUFs.
2. Cost-effective: Since many computer systems have some form of DRAM
on board, DRAMs can be used as an effective system-level PUF as well. It
is also much cheaper than SRAM. Thus, DRAM PUFs could be a source
of random but reliable data for generating board identifications (chip ID).
The advantage of the DRAM PUF is based on the fact that the stand-
alone DRAM already present in a System on a Chip (SoC) can be used
for generating device specific signatures without requiring any additional
circuitry or hardware [37]. PUFs intrinsic to DRAM ICs have not been
explored extensively. Ours is one of the first works in which a DRAM has
been used as a system level security Physical Unclonable Function.
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2.3.2 Potential DRAM PUF Implementations
DRAM memory cells are comprised of a paired transistor and capacitor. While
ideally every DRAM cell should be identical, manufacturing imperfections cause
slight physical variations in each cell. Moreover, every DRAM cell has its own
physical trait. Therefore, the leakage effects on the storage nodes will vary as
well. These physical variation characteristics can be potentially used to develop
PUFs. The only previous work on DRAM PUF has been based on altering or
disabling the refresh cycle [52]. Modern DRAM chips have a built in self-refresh
module, as they not only require a power supply to retain data, but must also be
periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents from fading away from the
capacitors in their integrated circuits. The essential approach with refresh-based
DRAM PUFs is to initialize all cells to 1 and then after some time, with refresh
turned off, some of the cells will leak to 0. The randomness of which cells leak to
0 provide the opportunity for a PUF. The difficulty with using these refresh or
retention based methods for a PUF is that it may take several minutes to hours
for sufficient cells to flip to 0. Another potential approach is to use the remanence
property of DRAMs. Contrary to popular belief, DRAMs can hold their values for
surprisingly long intervals without power. DRAM cells retain their contents for a
few seconds to minutes at room temperature. In fact, it has been demonstrated
that sensitive information can be extracted from volatile memories due to data
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remanence effects [31], [35]. Based on our examination on DRAMs, remanence
approach is not feasible for constructing PUFs, however remanence effect can be
used for creating True Random Number Generators (TRNGs).
2.3.3 Startup Value Based DRAM PUF
In our observation of DRAM refresh and remanence properties, however, we no-
ticed that certain DRAMs actually exhibit behavior similar to SRAMs, i.e. they
have seemingly random startup values. In other words, the cells do not initialize
to ’0’ as would be expected. Thus, as with SRAMs, these startup values pro-
vide a potential for creating a PUF. The reason for this random startup behavior
can be explained by the interaction of precharge, row decoder, and column select
lines when the device is powered up. Figure 2.1 shows the structure of a typical
DRAM array. Bits are stored either by charging the storage capacitor to VDD or
discharging it to ground. The timing diagram of the DRAM read operation of
an uncharged cells is shown in Figure 2.2. In order to reduce the electric field
stress on the capacitor, one of the plates of the capacitor is usually biased to
VDD
2
. Before the reading operation, the signal to precharge the bit lines (PEQ) is
disabled. In normal operation, before reading the cell, the bitlines (BL and BLB)
and sensing nodes (SA and SAB) are precharged to VDD
2
, and when the wordline
is activated, the bitlines voltage will change slightly depending on the capacitance
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of the storage capacitor. This slight change is detected by the sense amplifier as
a ’1’ (Vdd) or ’0’ (Vss) as shown in Figure 2.2. In other words, the level of BL
and BLB nodes eventually reaches the operating voltage (Vdd) or ground (Vss),
respectively [45]. At startup, however, the storage capacitor has neither been
charged to VDD nor discharged to ground. Thus, at startup, the nominal voltage
of each capacitor (Vc) is equal to the bias voltage VDD
2
which is equal to the bitline
precharge voltage. Thus, when read, the sense amplifier is equally likely to read a
’1’ or ’0’. However, because of manufacturing variations, the storage capacitance
of each bit will have slight differences, which leads to biasing of each bit to either
a ’1’ or a ’0’. This behavior is what allows the startup values of the DRAM to
function as a PUF.
2.3.4 Uniformity of Memory
We start with an examination of the uniformity of a DRAM-based PUF. Ideally,
50% of the bits should be ’1’ and 50% should be ’0’. For each of the 8 DRAMs
used for startup value experiments, we took 10 measurements of the uniformity -
i.e. the percentage of bits that were ’1’ or ’0’ at startup. As shown in Figure 2.3,
without any write operation to the DRAM cells, they have start up values and
some of the cells values are one. While not perfectly uniform, the uniformity is
close enough to ideal that with proper bit selection it can be used as a PUF. This
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Fig. 2.1: Memory structure of a One-Transistor DRAM array.
error bar shows the average, minimum and maximum percentage of ’1’ values
of each DRAM (DRAM1 to DRAM8) across different trials. As an example for
DRAM1, the average, minimum and maximum percentages of 1’s among all 10
measurements are 53.35%, 50.73% and 56.78%, respectively. As can be seen, there
is a slight bias to ’1’ in all the DRAMs. Also, we looked at the distribution of
1’s within some of the DRAMs (DRAM1, DRAM2 and DRAM3) to make sure
that they are not accumulated in some parts and saw that they are uniformly
distributed across all the DRAM cells.
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Fig. 2.2: Timing diagram of a DRAM read operation of an uncharged cells biased
to Vdd (a) or Vss (b) due to process variations.
2.4 Experimental Setup
We used a set of 1-MBit HM51100AL CMOS DRAMs in DIP packages. Our setup
essentially consists of four parts. Data acquisition experimental setup the FPGA
based development board (Spartan 6 FPGA), the power supply & digital storage
oscilloscope, the breadboard-based circuit (extension circuit), and the host PC.
During data collection, the power supply supplies voltage to the extension circuit
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Fig. 2.3: Uniformity of DRAMs across 10 measurements for each of 8 DRAMs
(average percentages of 1s values)
(off-chip DRAMs) that is mounted on the breadboard and we check the voltage
levels using the oscilloscope. The communication between the host PC and the
FPGA is composed of two connections: USB connection which is used for FPGA
configuration download. The other one is a high density serial connector which is
used for data communication between the PC software, ISE Design Suit 14.7, and
the software running on the FPGA (Developed using Xilinx EDK). In other words,
The FPGA was programmed to control the test sequence supplied to the DRAM
chip and transmit the outputs of the DRAM to a computer using an on-board
USB-UART module.
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2.5 DRAM PUF Evaluation under Different Environmental
Operating Conditions
Here, we examine the stability of the DRAM PUF bits under various environmen-
tal operating conditions. A stable bit is a bit that does not change in any trial
and remains the same over different measurements of the same or different condi-
tions. There are various parameters that can affect PUF stability such as process
variation, PUF activity, temperature, supply voltage, etc. Others have proposed
PUFs that take into account both process and environmental variations such as
crosstalk which magnifies chip-to-chip signature randomness and uniqueness [100].
One of the advantages of our work is the stability evaluation against different op-
erating conditions for more than one DRAM. We did all the experiments for three
DRAMs which we will call them DRAM1, DRAM2 and DRAM3. We explore the
differences between reliable and unreliable DRAM cell values, and the impact of
operating conditions on them. To make a PUF highly reliable across its lifetime,
unstable bits that are easily flipped by different operating conditions should not
be used.
We start with baseline measurements (Nominal Condition (NC)) with the
temperature set to 25 ◦C and the voltage to 5 V. For each DRAM, we took 10
measurements whereby we read all 1,048,576 (220) startup bits. The result from
Table 2.1 shows that for DRAM1, 37.9% of the startup values were read as ’0’
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across all 10 measurements and likewise 43.5% were read as ’1’ across all 10
measurements. Thus, 81.4% of the bits are marked stable, and the remaining
18.6% of bits, which read as both ’0’ and ’1’ on different measurements, are
marked as unstable.
Table 2.1: DRAMs Stability across Different Nominal Conditions
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
Bit Value Bit Value Bit Value
0 1 0 1 0 1
37.9% 43.5% 27.9% 37.6% 26.6% 37.7%
81.4% 65.5% 64.3%
2.5.1 Stability of DRAM under Temperature Variation
We performed the experiments by sweeping the temperature from 0 ◦C to 80 ◦C
using a ThemoStream system which is shown in Figure 2.4. In Table 2.2, we
show the bit stability under both high temperature (80 ◦C) and low temperature
(0 ◦C) conditions. NC-HT and NC-LT compare the stability of the DRAMs data
under high temperature (HT) and low temperature (LT) conditions to the nominal
condition (NC) stability, respectively - i.e. the percentage of nominal stable bits.
In Table 2.2, stability means comparing a bit against the nominal condition. First,
we derive the stable bits among the 10 measurements for each condition - i.e.
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remain the same across all 10 measurements. Second, we find the stable bits
among 10 measurements of the nominal condition. Finally, we identify which bits
are stable across both sets of bits and the output provides the final stability results
shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Stability under Temperature Variations compared to Nominal Conditions
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
% of stable bits % of stable bits % of stable bits
NC-HT 78.8% 64.4% 49.8%
NC-LT 49.9% 54.4% 44.3%
Fig. 2.4: Experimental setup with Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA (right side) under
the test using the ThermoStream system for high and low temperature
variations.
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Table 2.3: Stability under Voltage Variations compared to Nominal Conditions
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
% of stable bits % of stable bits % of stable bits
NC-HV 55.4% 54.3% 30.5%
NC-LV 43.3% 26.7% 23.8%
2.5.2 Stability of DRAM PUF under Voltage Variation
We vary the nominal supply by 10% up and 10% down, and observe the PUF’s
stability. Twenty measurements of startup values are taken at low voltage (4.5v)
and high voltage (5.5v) (10 from each voltage). Table 2.3 contains the bit stability
under both high and low voltage conditions for different DRAMs. Again, NC-HV
and NC-LV compare the stability of the DRAMs data under high voltage (HV)
and low temperature (LV) conditions to the nominal condition (NC) stability,
respectively. As with temperature, we see that voltage variations can have an
impact on the bit stability. The reason is because of the structure of a DRAM
cell which consists of capacitor and a transistor. The startup values of a DRAM
are dependent on the bias voltage of the capacitor, very slight variations in the
power supply voltage can alter the voltage differential across the capacitor.
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2.5.3 Stability of DRAM PUF due to Aging
Finally, we explore the potential impact of aging on the stability of the DRAM
PUF. Several aging mechanisms can affect reliability during the lifetime of an IC.
VLSI phenomena such as bias temperature instability (BTI), hot carrier injec-
tion (HCI), electro-migration and temperature-dependent dielectric breakdown
(TDDB) are some of the causes of aging. As was mentioned in [101], among
the BTIs, negative BTI (NBTI) affecting pMOS has more donating aging effect
compared to positive BTI (PBTI) affecting nMOS. NBTI is enhanced by high
temperature and high supply voltage. They both increase the threshold voltage
and decrease the speed of CMOS transistors. A high switching rate in a circuit
as well as excess supply voltage can enhance the HCI effect. A high operating
voltage as well as higher temperatures can accelerate time-dependent dielectric
breakdown (TDDB), a failure mechanism in MOSFETs.
In order to test the effects of aging on these DRAMs, we accelerated the
aging process by performing burn-in of the DRAM using the ThermoStream burn-
in system. We did 8 hours of high-temperature aging at 80 ◦C to approximate the
effects of 6 months of aging. In Table IV, NC-AA refers to the aging condition,
and the table compares the stability of the aged DRAMs data to the nominal
condition stability. The amount of stability degradation is not constant for each
device. Table 2.4 shows that after aging still 71%, 65%, and 55.1% of the cells
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remain stable after aging across different measurements for DRAM1, DRAM2,
and DRAM3, respectively.
Table 2.4: Stability under Aging Condition compared to Nominal Conditions
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
% of stable bits % of stable bits % of stable bits
NC-AA 71% 65% 55.1%
2.6 Bit Selection Algorithm for Generating PUF IDs
Bit selection algorithm is an algorithm to select a set of bits for an ID/key that
has a high likelihood of being stable [106]. The key insight of the algorithm is
that we use spatial information within the DRAMs to infer the stability of a bit
cell. We have a grid for memory rows and columns that can give us a very good
picture of the cell distribution in the memory array. Thus, spatial correlations
(neighborhood stable cells) can be made in both x and y directions. In all, the
algorithm uses spatial information within the DRAMs to infer the stability of a
bit cell. In other words, stable neighbors provides better reliability than random
selection. The basic algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The DRAM is organized
as an array of cells - in our case for a 1-MBit DRAM the array is 1024 rows by
1024 columns. We count the number of stable bits (ones and zeros) in each row
and then select rows that have more stable bits than specific thresholds (T1 and
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T2). Thresholds have been chosen based on experimentation in order to select
2048 bits (16 128-bits keys). In the ideal case, half will be zeros and half ones,
among 1 MBit data in the next level of the algorithm. T1 and T2 are different
in order to get the equal number of bits (ones and zeros) for the PUF ID bits.
In fact, we have an algorithm to adjust the thresholds (T1 and T2). First we
selected a random threshold value and then based on the number of 1s and 0s
that have been selected, our algorithm can change the threshold value to upper
or lower value in order to get 50% of ’1’s (1024 bits) and 50% of ’0’s (1024 bits).
T1 and T2 are the thresholds for choosing rows that have more stable ’1’s and
’0’s, respectively. Among selected rows, those bits that have stable neighbors
also identified as potential highly stable bits suitable for enrollment as the PUF
ID/key. Note that T1 and T2 should be selected in a way to find almost equal
number of ’1’s and ’0’s bits for the IDs.
As shown in Figure 2.5, the most stable bits have been selected considering
the neighboring cells. Basically, it shows how to select the most stable and reliable
bits from 1024 rows by 1024 columns grid for PUF ID considering neighborhood
cell stability approach. The more the number of neighbors are stable around a
cell, the more reliable the cell is. In Figure 2.5, the green cell at the center with
value 1 has the best chance to be used as an ID bit since it has 8 neighbors which
are all stable. Similarly, the white cell is not very suitable to be used as an ID bit
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as it has several unstable neighbors around. We considered a 1024 by 1024 grid
(rows and columns) on the memory cells. PUF ID bits have been selected from
the bits that are stable among all the constraints (different operation conditions).
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Fig. 2.5: Schematic of grids (rows and columns) on DRAM cells.
2.7 Analysis of Experimental Results and Their Validation
In the section, we first explain the multi-device evaluation on DRAMs based on
different set of measurements, and then discuss the security metrics of uniqueness,
randomness, and reliability followed by their results.
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Algorithm 1 Highly Stable Bit Selection Algorithm for Selecting IDs from Different
DRAM PUFs
1: Apply n measurements to each operating and environmental conditions including
Normal Conditions (NC), High Temperature (HT), Low Temperature (LT), High
Voltage (HV), Low Voltage (LV).
2: Find bits that are stable across all n measurements of all conditions for the specific
DRAM that has been enrolled (DRAM1 or DRAM2 or DRAM3). Note that we
do not perform aging during enrollment because it is not practical to age the chip
because of the time involved.
3: Count the number of stable bits (ones and zeros separately) in each DRAM cells
row.
4: Select rows R that have more stable bits than selected thresholds ( T1 for ’1’s and
T2 for ’0’s ) which have been selected based on experimentation in order to select
2048 (16 IDs) bits.
5: For each row r ∈ R, enroll bits (r, j) that have a neighborhood of stable bits where
r is the row number and j is the column number. The neighborhood of stable bits
is defined such that row r − 1 ∈ R and r + 1 ∈ R and bits (r, j − 1) and (r, j + 1)
are also stable.
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2.7.1 Multi-device Evaluation on DRAMs
Here, we compare the results between DRAM1, DRAM2 and DRAM3. For each
condition, we did 2-10 tests, collected data and the percentage of the stability
among those data (for example for the high temperature condition, we had 2-10
different measurements). A bit is marked stable if it has the same result for all
measurements. Figure 2.6 shows the percentages of 1s and 0s under different op-
erational conditions and different set of measurements (2, 4, 6, 8, and 10) between
DRAM1, DRAM2, and DRAM3. In most conditions, the degradation differences
between the percentages of 2 measurements condition and 10 measurements are
less than 10%. Figure 2.6 shows that by increasing the number of measurements,
the percentage of stable bits, 1s and 0s (both of them) does not decrease very fast.
Thus, most bits remain stable across multiple measurements.
2.7.2 Reliability
Reliability is a measure of repeatability or consistency with which a PUF generates
its response across environmental variations, temperature, voltage, and aging. In
our work, we chose stable bits based on the random selection and the proposed
highly stable bit selection algorithm as discussed in the previous section. Vari-
ous measurements from different operational conditions (HT, LT, etc) were used
for each DRAM to apply bit selection algorithm on them. Then based on the
38
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f
  
‘0
’s
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
2 4 6 8 10
NC1
HT1
LT1
HV1
LV1
AA1
Number of Measurements
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
2 4 6 8 10
NC2
HT2
LT2
HV2
LV2
AA2
Number of Measurements
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f
  
‘1
’s
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
2 4 6 8 10
NC3
HT3
LT3
HV3
LV3
AA3
Number of Measurements
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f
  
‘1
’s
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
2 4 6 8 10
NC1
HT1
LT1
HV1
LV1
AA1
Number of Measurements
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f
  
‘1
’s
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
2 4 6 8 10
NC2
HT2
LT2
HV2
LV2
AA2
Number of Measurements
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f
  
‘0
’s
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
2 4 6 8 10
NC3
HT3
LT3
HV3
LV3
AA3
Number of Measurements
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
s 
o
f
  
‘0
’s
(a1)
(a2)
(b1)
(b2)
(c1)
(c2)
Fig. 2.6: Muti-device evaluation; (a1) & (a2), (b1) & (b2), and (c1) & (c2)
show the stability (percentages of ’1’s and ’0’s) across different set of
measurements for DRAM1, DRAM2, DRAM3 respectively.
number of distinct measurement approach (n=1 or n=2), we can determine which
approach produced fewer bit flips during reconstruction phase. Our results show
clearly that there is a relationship between better stability with bit selection and a
higher number of distinct measurements (n), as shown in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6.
We use Hamming Distance (HD) across different PUF measurements as the ba-
sis of our metric. To estimate the reliability metric, an n-bit response (Ri) from
challenge C and from chip i should be extracted at normal operating condition
(room temperature and normal supply voltage). The same challenge C is applied
to chip i at a different operating condition to extract an n-bit response (Ri,2).
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In the same way, T samples can be collected from chip i at different operating
conditions. Hence, the average reliability metric (r) is estimated as:
ri =
1
T
T∑
t=1
HD(Ri, Ri,t)
n
× 100% [63] (2.1)
where Ri,t is the t-th sample of Ri . The reliability metric shows the average
number of reliable PUF responses. Ideally, this value should be 0.
Fig. 2.7: Distribution of Intra-die Hamming Distance (HD) among 48 (3 × 16)
DRAM-based PUFs under different operating conditions.
For measuring intra-die HD, we consider 48 IDs (16 IDs associate with each
DRAMs). Each ID has been compared with different measurements of every op-
erating conditions such as (Nominal Condition, High Temperature, Low Temper-
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Table 2.5: Percentage of bit flips across multiple measurements (10-Sets) under Base-
line (Base), Neighbor Selection (NS), Environmental Screening (ES), and
combined (Algo) approaches.
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
Base NS ES Algo Base NS ES Algo Base NS ES Algo
n=1 78.5% 13.5% 19.8% 13.8% 78.3% 20.6% 15.4% 13.5% 75.6% 18.3% 21.7% 10.4%
n=2 76.1% 8.7% 11.3% 3.8% 72.5% 13.5% 7.1% 7.7% 72.2% 14.4% 9.9% 8.8%
n=3 73.9% 6.6% 6.9% 2.3% 71.8% 7.6% 4.7% 3.1% 71.9% 8.5% 7.5% 3.8%
ature, High Voltage, Low Voltage, and Aging). Figure 2.7 shows the distribution
of intra-die HD of 48 IDs from 3 DRAMs under various conditions. As it is shown,
most of the IDs are stable under different conditions.
Table 2.6: Percentage of bit flips across multiple measurements under normal oper-
ating conditions.
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
BLine Algo BLine Algo BLine Algo
n=1 47.3% 2.1% 50.4% 2.3% 49.5% 3.1%
n=2 45.9% 1.5% 46.9% 1.4% 44.2% 1.7%
n=3 45.2% 0.9% 45.7% 0.8% 43.1% 1.1%
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2.7.3 Our Selection Algorithm vs Baseline Algorithm
As indicated earlier, we used our selection algorithm to select 16 128-bit keys from
the available bits and compared it to a naive baseline algorithm where 16 keys
are selected at random from the 1-MBit set. In both cases, the enrollment is done
based on either one, two, or three distinct measurements. In other words, n = 1,
n = 2, or n = 3 for the algorithm in Algorithm 1. The baseline case only uses
1, 2, or 3 nominal case measurements, whereas our selection algorithm uses 5-15
measurements - 1, 2 or 3 each for NC, LV, HV
2.7.4 Uniqueness
We evaluate the uniqueness of the DRAM PUFs. In particular, Uniqueness means
that the responses resulting from evaluating the same challenge on different PUF
instances should not be similar. The uniqueness of a PUF circuit among a popula-
tion of PUF circuits manufactured, depends on various factors such as the process
variation of a particular manufacturing process, any manufacturing defects and
the metric used to evaluate uniqueness. Inter-die HD can be used to evaluate the
uniqueness of the PUFs data. It is typically used which averages the hamming
distance between responses of various PUFs over multiple CRPs. Assume that
there are k-chips and Ri and Rj are the n-bit responses to a challenge C from
chip i and j, respectively. Then the Inter-die HD among k chips is defined as: LT,
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and HT. Aging is not used for enrollment because of the time involved and since
it also shortens the lifetime of the device. Since our algorithm is a combination
of a neighborhood selection algorithm as well as screening due to environmen-
tal measurements, we also evaluated each of these approaches separately. We
evaluate the effectiveness of the selection algorithm by comparing the effect on
reconstruction of the 16 keys. Ideally, on reconstruction we should read back the
same bits. Table VI contains a summary of our PUF ID reconstruction results.
Reconstruction consists of reading the keys back ten times under all conditions
(NC, LV, HV, LT, HT and aging) - 60 reconstructions for each of the cases in the
table. The data shows the number of bits that ipped in any of the reconstructions.
As can be seen, the use of the enrollment algorithm (Algo) with just n = 1 - i.e.
5 measurements - reduces the number of bit ips for DRAM1 from nearly 79%
in average for the baseline (Base) to less than 14%, which is sufficient for using
the PUF for chip identification. In fact, our results show that we can also use
this PUF for key generation with minimal ECC check bits. Furthermore, using
more measurements during enrollment can decrease the number of bit ips signifi-
cantly to 2-3%. It is interesting to note that while Neighborhood Selection (NS)
and Environmental Selection (ES) are somewhat effective on their own, we get
significantly better performance when both are used together (Algo). Note that
Table VI is a worst case in that we examined the number of bit ips across multiple
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measurements including under extreme operating conditions (40 measurements).
Typically, however, reconstruction will be done under normal operating condi-
tions. Table VII indicates the percentage of bit ips when reconstructing under
just normal conditions. As can be seen, the bit ip rate is reduced to less than 3%
with one set of measurements and to less than 1% with 3 sets of measurements.
Inter − dieHD = 2
k(k − 1)
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
HD(Ri, Rj)
n
× 100% (2.2)
Ideally, the Hamming Distance (HD) between the responses should differ 50% of
total responses bits.
We calculated the average Inter-Hamming distance between all pairs of IDs
that were extracted from the different PUFs (DRAM1, DRAM2 and DRAM3)
based on our bit selection algorithm. Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of Inter-
die HD of the 48 IDs from the 3 DRAMs. The average HD is 0.4937 and close to
the ideal 0.5. Hence, the proposed DRAM PUFs can provide unique identifiers.
As shown in Figure 2.8, the HD points tend to be very close to the mean of the
set, as can be seen by the very small standard deviation of 0.055.
2.7.5 Randomness
In PUF design, the randomness of the data is very important as it can prevent the
prediction of the cell values or the ID bits. In other words, perfectly random data
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Fig. 2.8: Distribution of Inter-die Hamming Distance (HD) of 3 DRAMs among
Different the extracted IDs.
means that the PUF cells are generated independently of each other, and the value
of the next cell cannot be predicted, regardless of how many cells have already
been produced. PUFs using intrinsic randomness are very attractive as they can
be included in a design without applying any modifications to the manufacturing
process. Note that if the HD uniqueness measure discussed above is 50%, it does
not mean that data is necessarily random. To evaluate the Randomness of a PUF,
statistical tests such as the NIST Test [87], Machine Learning (ML) techniques,
Shannon entropy, or Min-entropy can be applied to the PUF data. Here, we
considered Min-entropy as a metric to estimate the unpredictability (randomness)
of our DRAM PUF data.
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Min-entropy is an approach for estimating the randomness of the PUF re-
sponses based on experimental data [54]. In particular, min-entropy indicates how
many bits of a PUF response are uniformly random. In this literature, we esti-
mate the entropy and min-entropy of the responses of all available PUFs. We have
three DRAMs and for each of them, 16 IDs were selected based on the algorithm.
Min-entropy is estimated as:
PMAX = MAX{Hwt(i), 1−Hwt(i)} (2.3)
Min-Entropy =
1
128
128∑
i=1
(− log2 (PMAX(i))) (2.4)
where i is the number of ID bits. First, we have to consider Hwt(i) for each bit
over all IDs. In fact, the Hamming weight of a bit Hwt(i) is defined as the number
of non-zero bits. The min-entropy that has been calculated based on Equation 1
which is 0.9483. This value is approximately close to the ideal case min-entropy
of 1.
2.7.6 Case Studies
We evaluate security analysis such as reliability, uniqueness, and randomness for
two different cases for ID extraction.
• Case1: Here, our goal is to find the maximum number of IDs using Al-
gorithm 1. The enrollment and reconstruction are exactly similar to the
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results in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 except the thresholds (T1 and T2) have
been set to zero.
• Case2: In this case, we try to find the maximum number of IDs with 100%
reliability. To achieve this goal, 40 measurements from different operating
conditions have been considered to extract the bits that are stable. Then
we apply Algorithm 1 on the stable bits to directly select the ID bits. In
other words, for the enrollment phase, all measurements of all conditions (40
measurements) are considered instead of one measurement of each conditions
(5 measurements). Similar to Case1, the difference between the result from
Case2 in Table refcases12 and Table 2.5 is that the thresholds (T1 and T2)
in Algorithm 1 are zero for Case2. Note that in Table refcases12, Reli. is the
Reliability, Unique. is the Uniqueness and Min-Ent. is the Min-Entropy.
From Table 2.7, the maximum number of IDs for DRAM1, DRAM2, and
DRAM3 are 263, 178, and 205 in Case1, and 16, 29, and 22 in Case2. As is
shown in Table 2.7, reliability, uniqueness, and min-entropy have been calculated
in different cases for different DRAMs using equations 1, 2, and 4 respectively. As
a result of using all measurements for Case2, we are able to get 100% reliability,
better uniqueness metrics, and a min-entropy that is very close to ideal. However,
we are not able to enroll as many IDs in Case2 because of the restrictive enrollment
process. As can be seen, the reliability results in Table 2.7 are lower than what
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was shown in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6.
Table 2.7: Quality Evaluation of IDs from DRAM PUFs.
DRAM1 DRAM2 DRAM3
Case1 Case2 Case1 Case2 Case1 Case2
No. IDs 263 16 178 29 205 22
Reli. 81% 100% 75.4% 100% 70.7% 100%
Unique. 0.539 0.503 0.581 0.514 0.448 0.492
Min Ent. 0.89 0.99 0.78 0.96 0.86 0.98
2.8 DRAM PUFs Reliability Analysis due to Device Accelerated
Aging
2.8.1 PUFs under Accelerated Aging
Many PUFs are known to suffer from aging and lose their reliability over time
- i.e. they no longer consistently return the same responses. As reliability goes
down, the PUF loses its usefulness as a practical authentication device. The aging
effects on a PUF are due to the degradation of transistors as a consequence of
aggressive scaling in CMOS in recent years [46] [80]. As technology has entered
the nanometer regime, several important factors cause degradation in transistor
including negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) [84], hot carrier injec-
tion (HCI), and temperature dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB) [70]. This
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degradation mainly manifests itself as an increase of transistor threshold voltage.
NBTI causes a gradual increase in the threshold voltage and decrease in the mo-
bility, drain current and transconductance, which is most evident and occurs in
switched-on PMOS transistors. Recently, there has been significant work that
evaluated the effects of environmental conditions especially accelerated aging on
different types of PUFs. Abhranil et al. performed an accelerated aging testing
on an FPGA-based RO PUF and analyzed its affects on the functionality of the
PUF in [62]. Based on their observation, aging makes PUF responses unreliable
but the randomness of PUF responses remains unaffected. Wei et al. proposed a
method that can tolerate bit errors from responses of PUFs to make them highly
reliable in [110] and [109]. In [28], Achiranshu et al. evaluated the device aging
effect to present a technique for improving uniformity (distribution of 1s & 0s)
and reliability. Another study has been done by Dinesh et al. in [27] on evaluating
device aging on the stability of ring oscillator PUFs for different PUF circuit-level
choices and operating conditions. In [59], the authors investigated the effects of
data-dependent silicon aging on SRAM PUF reliability under a number of realis-
tic scenarios. They claimed that some scenarios even show anti-aging effects. In
2016, Rahman et al. [78] proposed a new aging-resistant design that reduces sen-
sitivity to negative-bias temperature instability and hot-carrier injection stresses.
Since DRAM PUF behavior is primarily determined by process variations in the
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storage capacitor rather than variations in the transistor, it is likely that aging
due to NBTI may not be an issue. In this section, we investigate the effects of
aging on DRAM PUFs functionality. Specifically, we have the following contribu-
tions. 1). Study of the impact of Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI)
on the read stability of DRAM PUFs over a period of 18 months. 2). Investiga-
tion of the reliability of aged DRAM PUFs selected IDs. 3). Aging analysis using
implementation of realistic aged DRAM chips.
Transistor-based Aging Effects
Aging is an extremely important issue for devices that must remain in operation
for decades. Transistor aging effects in nanoscale CMOS result in transistor per-
formance degradation over the device life-time. The primary physical mechanism
behind transistor aging is Bias Temperature Instability (BTI). Such transistor
aging results in circuit performance degradation over time. Bias Temperature In-
stability (BTI) effect can be further divided into NBTI and PBTI. NBTI effect
degrades the performance of PMOS over time by increasing its threshold voltage.
Similarly PBTI effect degrades the performance of NMOS. As the use of High
K (dielectric constant) materials is increasing, PBTI effects are also increasing.
Moreover, due to transistor aging effects in nano-scale, circuit delay will increase
over the lifetime the device. Transistor aging also impacts the clock skew over
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time [85]. In the case of a DRAM PUF, however, transistor aging due to BTI
does not affect the behavior of the PUF. Since the transistor is only used as an
access transistor, changes in the threshold voltage or speed of the transistor do
not change the startup value of the DRAM cell.
Capacitor-based Aging Effects
Over the last decade, significant increases in MOS capacitor reliability have been
achieved through a combination of advanced manufacturing techniques, new ma-
terials, and diagnostic methodologies to provide requisite life-cycle reliability for
high energy pulse applications. In general, the capacitance of certain capaci-
tors decreases as the component ages. In more details, the relationship between
life/aging rate and the dielectric in a capacitor is usually expressed in terms of a
power law where the change in life will be equal to the inverse of the change in
stress raised to some power [89]. For the first time, a capacitor technology has
been developed in [89] in 1997 that is essentially graceful-aging and contains no
intrinsic single point failure modes. Within the context of a DRAM PUF, changes
in the capacitance due to aging do not affect the start up value of the DRAM cell,
since the determining factor of the start up value is variations in the bias voltage
of the capacitor.
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2.8.2 Experimental Platforms
Our proposed approaches are evaluated on an experiment platform, the Xilinx
Spartan 6 FPGA on a Digilent Atlys board. The off-chip DIP DRAMs were
mounted and wired to a prototype board that has a high density serial connec-
tor during data collection. The serial connector allows the prototype board to
interface with the FPGA. Then, programmed FPGA controls the test sequences
applied to the DRAM and transmit the results/outputs from the DRAM chip to
a computer (workstation) using a USB-UART module. All experiments are per-
formed using our ThermoStream Burn-in System (Temptronic TP04100A Ther-
moStream Thermal Inducting System) to accelerate aging. Each measurement is
performed at a VDD of 5V and at room temperature and consists of 144 start up
state readings at different dates from Sep. 2014 to Feb. 2016.
2.8.3 DRAM PUFs Aging Effects Study and Procedure
in Section 2.5, we showed the results of different experiments on DRAM PUFs
in different operating conditions i.e. high temperature, low voltage, aging, and
etc. Here, we particularly focus on the effect of long-term aging on DRAM PUF
behavior. We selected a 1 MBit HM51100AL CMOS DIP DRAM and evaluated
3 different DRAM ICs over the course of 18 months from Sep. 2014 to Feb. 2016.
To accelerate the aging on 3 DRAMs (DRAM1, DRAM2, and DRAM3), in Sept.
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2014 we initially performed burn-in of the DRAM using our Thermostream burn-
in system. We did 8 hours of high-temperature aging at 80 ◦C on dram1, dram2
and dram3 to approximate the effects of 6 months of aging. For data collection, we
need to get various measurements before and after aging the DRAMs. Before aging
the DRAMs, we gathered different startup measurements at Nominal Condition
(NC) (operating temperature: 25 ◦C and voltage: 5 volt). After the DRAMs were
aged in Sept. 2014, we again obtained measurements from each DRAM in Sep.
2015, Feb. 2015, Mar. 2015, Apr. 2015, Jul. 2015, Aug. 2015, Jan. 2016, and
Feb. 2016. Thus, in summary, that we took 10 measurements from each DRAM
at nominal conditions in Sept. 2014 (30 measurements in total for all 3 DRAMs
under NC), and 6 measurements from each DRAM at each date of the year from
Sep. 2014 to Feb. 2016 (144 measurements in total for all 3 DRAMs after aging).
After getting those measurements, we need to evaluate and analyze the stability
of DRAM PUFs under nominal and aging conditions. A bit is defined as stable if
it remains the same under different measurements. Table I shows the stability of
dram1, dram2, and dram3 due to fresh (un-aged) and aged conditions at different
dates of the experiment and compared with nominal conditions. For example,
the percentages of stable bits (’1’s and ’0’s) on Sep. 2014 at pre-aging condition
are 88.9%, 91.6%, and 89.7% for dram1, dram2, and dram3, respectively. As
shown in Table 2.8, at aged-DRAMs condition, the percentages of stable bits do
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not change that much especially for dram1. Furthermore, these small changes
are very normal and still a large amount of data are stable during the 18-month
period of time of our experiments on DRAMs. Based on our observations, our
DRAMs (dram1, dram2, and dram3) which are under experiments for aging effects
on PUFs functionality, are much more stable than what we even expected before
starting this project, since it is a common expectation that aging has irreversible
effects on devices.
Table 2.8: Stability of DRAMs due to Aging compare to Nominal Conditions
dram1 dram2 dram3
stable bits (%) stable bits (%) stable bits (%)
Pre-aging (un-aged) Condition
Sep. 2014 88.9% 91.6% 89.7%
Aged DRAMs
Sep. 2014 87.1% 90.1% 80.2%
Feb. 2015 86.4% 85.1% 83.1%
Mar. 2015 90.2% 83.2% 78.0%
Apr. 2015 85.8% 82.4% 76.6%
Jul. 2015 87.3% 81.7% 81.3%
Aug. 2015 86.7% 81.2% 80.1%
Jan. 2016 86.2% 82.7% 82.4%
Feb. 2016 87.5% 84.6% 81.9%
2.8.4 Reliability of DRAM PUFs under Aging Condition
Here, we analyze and examine the security properties of the three aged DRAM
PUF through reliability. Reliability gives a dimension to evaluate whether the
PUF generates stable responses for the same challenge under different environ-
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Fig. 2.9: Percentage of bit flips across multiple measurements (a) under accel-
erated aging condition (Bit Selection Algorithm), (b) under random
condition (Random Bit Selection)
mental conditions. In other words, reliability means that the secret key or ID
generated by the DRAM PUF will be the same despite any changing operating
conditions. Note that we select 2048 bits (16 128-bits keys) from each DRAM PUF
and ideally half of the bits should be zeros and half ones. To ensure the reliability
of the DRAM PUF response, the output needs to either be error corrected or an-
alyzed in such a way that only stable cells are selected and used. Furthermore, we
looked at DRAM cells arrays in a two dimensional (2D) structure including rows
and columns, and 1 Mbit DRAM is a 2D image of 1024 rows by 1024 columns.
Also, we have identified that neighbors stability status can be used to determine
the most reliable DRAM cells for IDs which is a simple bit selection algorithm for
selecting ID bits. In this algorithm, we try to find the cells that have the highest
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number of stable neighbors around. Those bits that have more stable neighbors
identified as potential highly stable bits which are suitable as the PUF ID/key.
Indeed, a stable cell which is surrounded by more stable cells is more likely to
remain stable because its neighboring cells have experienced similar aging effects.
Figure 2.9 a shows the percentages of bit flips across various measurements
from Sep. 2014 to Feb. 2016 of dram1 (blue), dram2 (orange), and dram3 (gray)
under aging condition after applying the bit selection algorithm. Note that relia-
bility is obtained from Equation 2.5. As can be seen, the percentages of flip bits
are changing over time for all three DRAMs. For example, bit flips for dram3
decreases significantly from Feb. 2015 to Jan. 2016 and increases to Feb. 2016.
There are various fluctuations in Figure 2.9 a in terms of bit flips. In some cases,
the reliability increases (bit flips decreases) and vice versa. In the worst case, we
can see less than 1% increase in the percentage of bit flips in dram2 from Sep.
2014 (0.16%) to Mar. 2015 (1.15%). On the other hand, in the best case, the
percentage of bit flips drops from Feb. 2015 to Mar. 2015 in dram1 from 1.44% to
0.27% (1.17%) which is a huge increase in the reliability. As shown in Figure 2.9
a, we can see more reliability improvement rather than reliability retrogression.
It seems that the initial aging measurement was within the margin of error that
we see over time, and one could make the case that aging has very little effect on
permanent behavior of the PUF. On the other hand, Figure 2.9 b shows the re-
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sults we got from random bit selection. There are huge differences between what
we got out of our algorithm (bit selection algorithm) and random bit selection
procedure. In some cases, almost 50% of the bits flip during random selections.
Reliability(%) = 100%− FlipBits(%) (2.5)
Conventionally, another metric to estimate the reliability of our DRAM
PUFs under aging condition is represented by the (normalized) Intra-die Ham-
ming Distance (HD) of the PUFs responses. An n-bit reference response (Ri)
is extracted from the chip i at the nominal condition. The same n-bit response
is extracted at a different operating condition (in particular, accelerated aging
condition) with a value (R′i). S samples of (R
′
i) is taken for each of the operat-
ing conditions. The reliability is defined as follows which is the average Intra-die
Hamming Distance:
1
S
S∑
t=1
HD(Ri, R
′
i,t)
n
× 100% (2.6)
where R′i,t is the t-th sample of Ri. The responses that being compared here are
produced from the same DRAM chip.
In more details, for the calculation of conventional intra-die HDs, we use the
readout response values after applying our bit selection algorithm for selecting ID
bits, 16-128 bits IDs from each DRAM, regardless of whether the responses have
stabilized or not. Based on the IDs collected from 3 DRAM PUF instances (dram1,
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dram2, and dram3), with 48 IDs in total, we obtained the distribution of intra-die
HDs shown in Figure 2.10.
Figure 2.10 displays the Hamming distance between different IDs extracted
from each DRAM PUFs in order to evaluate their reliability. Because of the
space limitation, we demonstrated the intra-die HD of 3 DRAMs at each date
(i.e. Sep. 2014 in Figure 2.10(a)) in 1 histogram. We know that the intra-die HD
is the hamming distance between the IDs/keys of an individual DRAM. The vast
majority of Hamming distance values are between 0 and 0.5% for all the dates
(Sep. 2014 to Feb. 2016) as shown in Figure 2.10. Based on the results we got
from the intra-die HDs in Figure 2.10, we see that most of the IDs remain stable
even after 18 months.
2.9 DRAM PUF as a System Security Solution
Since DRAMs are a system/board level component, they offer an opportunity to
use the DRAM PUF to authenticate the system. However, since the DRAM is
not embedded within another Integrated Circuit (IC), it is potentially subject to
attacks that may compromise the PUF. Two main vulnerabilities are that the
pins are easily probed and the DRAM can be removed/replaced from the board.
Since the pins of the DRAM are easily accessible, an attacker could exhaustively
read all the memory cells in the DRAM and store the startup values. Using these
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Fig. 2.10: Percentages of HDs of DRAMs among different IDs under Aging condition
in (a) Sep. 2014, (b)Feb. 2015, (c) Mar. 2015, (d) Apr. 2015, (e) Jul. 2015
(f) Aug. 2015, (g) Jan. 2016, and (h) Feb. 2016.
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stored values, the attacker could then theoretically reproduce the PUF responses of
that DRAM. Note that, because of the difficulty of replicating process variation,
it would be impossible to actually replicate a DRAM with the same physical
responses. Instead, however, an attacker could add nonvolatile storage to the
DRAM to store the startup values. Because of the large size of typical DRAMs,
this attack is relatively impractical. Essentially, one would need to more than
double the cost of the DRAM to add the nonvolatile storage. Moreover, the attack
would need to determine whether the DRAM is in startup or not, meaning that
there would need to be extra circuitry to detect writes to the DRAM. A simple
approach would turn off the nonvolatile storage and turn on the actual DRAM on
detection of the first write. That could easily be defeated by simply writing a few
random cells at startup, thus requiring the attacker to monitor writes to every cell
thus increasing the cost of the attack significantly. In addition, if suspicious of
attacks, it would be relatively easy to determine that the DRAM package has an
extra embedded nonvolatile storage component by imaging the DRAM package.
As to the second vulnerability, an attacker could remove the DRAM package
from an authentic system and place it in another potentially counterfeit system
and thus allow the second system to be authenticated as valid. While this is pos-
sible, it does not allow the attacker to create a new ”authentic” system without
having access to a previously valid system. Presumably the previously authen-
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tic system is non-functional or has been taken out of the supply chain, because
otherwise the cost of the authentic system would make the need to counterfeit it
irrelevant. The attacker would need one authentic system for every counterfeit
system. To address this problem, manufacturers must keep a tight control of their
supply chain and ensure that any authentic systems that have been taken out of
the supply chain must either destroy the DRAMs or simply remove the DRAM
responses from the database.
2.10 Conclusion
This chapter identified unexpected startup behavior in a DRAM that could allow
the DRAM to be used as a PUF primitive with proper bit selection to maintain
high reliability and stability. We presented a novel PUF ID generation approach
and evaluated the practicality of our PUF with empirical data that was obtained
from a set of real DRAMs. Our experiments showed that temperature, voltage,
and aging can have a major impact on DRAM PUF stability. We proposed a
specific enrollment algorithm for generation of a stable PUF using memory cells
within a DRAM module. The evaluation of DRAM gives insight into the ran-
domness of the cells startup values, and their stability. The experimental results
demonstrate that our algorithm is very effective at finding the most stable bits to
be used as a 128-bit identifier. We also show that the DRAM PUFs randomness
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and uniqueness metrics are close to ideal. While DRAM PUFs may not exhibit
the same levels of stability as newer SRAM PUF techniques, they offer an oppor-
tunity for PUFs in systems that do not have SRAMs, require high numbers of
PUF CRPs, or want higher density than available with SRAM.
Chapter 3
DRAM-based Random Number Generation Design
3.1 Robust Hardware True Random Number Generations using
DRAM Remanence Effects
3.1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce a new approach for constructing a robust hardware
TRNG based on DRAM remanence effects. A robust hardware TRNG should have
a high level of randomness or unpredictability in the output. Otherwise, an ad-
versary can simply query the generator and predict the sensitive data. Our novel
approach focuses on creating a TRNG from DRAM devices or components that
are already present in most computing systems. This feature effectively allows for
DRAM to generate a TRNG without any extra hardware required to be added to
the system. Using this knowledge we designed an inexpensive cryptographic key
generator, implemented the findings and analyzed the results. The main advan-
tage of this approach over other TRNGs is that we can produce highly random
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bits without incurring any additional hardware costs. We also propose random
number generation based on DRAM startup behavior which will be presented in
Section 3.2.
3.1.2 Data Remanence
Data remanence is the residual information that remains on a storage medium
even after erasure (data clearing) or powering off the device. Data remanence as
a problem was first discovered in magnetic media [26], [34]. Thus, there is a pos-
sibility that sensitive information still can be extracted from non-volatile memory
that had presumably been erased. Additionally, supposedly volatile memories,
such as DRAM, are examples of storage components that they do not lose their
data immediately after power is removed. Furthermore, these memories exhibit
remanence effects wherein data stored for an appreciable amount of time in the
same location can leave a permanent recoverable trace in the memory cells. Data
remanence effects can play an important role in extracting the secret stored in-
formation from volatile memories. As mentioned in [26], data remanence is not a
directly evaluated criterion of trusted computing systems, but it is critical to the
safeguarding of information used by trusted computing systems. In [36], Halder-
man et al. have shown that DRAMs retain their contents for several seconds after
power is lost.
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3.1.3 DRAM Remanence-based TRNG
Here, we describe our methodology of using the DRAM remanence effect to pro-
pose a new TRNG model. We start with a brief review of a typical DRAM
architecture. A DRAM memory cell uses a single transistor and a capacitor to
store a bit of data. Cell information (voltage) is degraded mostly due to a junction
leakage current at the storage node. Therefore, the cell data must be read and
rewritten periodically even when memory arrays are not accessed. Essentially,
the DRAM controller must refresh each cells voltage before it decays to the point
where the bit information gets lost. Normally, the refresh rate is so high that each
cell gets refreshed several times per second. Figure 3.1 shows a DRAM cell array
that are arranged in rows (0 to n-1) and columns (0 to n-1) of memory cells called
wordlines and bitlines, respectively. Each memory cell has a unique location or
address defined by the intersection of a row and a column. One memory cell has
been magnified in Figure 3.1 which consists of a access transistor and a storage ca-
pacitor that is charged to produce a 1 or a 0. The processes of extracting random
bits from DRAMs, while considering the remanence effect and startup behavior
of DRAMs is briefly laid out as follows. As shown in Figure 3.2, the process is
first we write the value 1 to all cells of the available memory; this can be seen
as step a) in Figure 3.2. After the write operation, a delay function (step b) has
been applied to turn OFF the DRAM for certain amount of time, which is in
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milliseconds, and then turn the DRAM back on after a specific delay time. In the
next step, the entire 1 Mbit of data are read (step c) and stored.
The expectation was that, depending on the delay, a certain percentage of
the 1s written at startup would have flipped to 0 and the remainder would have
stayed 1 because of remanence. Presumably, which bits flipped would be random
and that could provide the bits for our TRNG sequence. However, it turns out
that DRAMs do not actually settle to all 0 when powered off completely. In
Chapter 2, we showed that certain DRAMs exhibit behavior similar to static
RAMs (SRAMs), i.e. they have seemingly random startup values after being
powered on. Thus, for determining the effect of remanence after various delays,
in our experiment we found that instead of flipping to ’0’, the bits will settle to
the original startup value at power on.
Experimental Setup
We experimented with several delay values to determine the effect of remanence
on the bit values. We used a Xilinx Spartan-6 XC6SLX45 FPGA experimental
platform similar to [49]. A power-cycle circuit was implemented in our experimen-
tal setup as to provide a method to deliver power to the DRAM chip and as well
as enabling (turning ON the DRAM) and disabling (turning OFF the DRAM)
the on-board DRAM chip located on the Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA board. We
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Fig. 3.1: DRAM cells array with a typical single MOSFET transistor and a stor-
age capacitor.
collected approximately 400 measurements of DDR2 SDRAMs based on various
delay time and under nominal environment conditions (temperature: 25 ◦CC and
DRAM voltage: 1.8 volt).
Our TRNG Model
Figure 3.3 shows the results of our experiments where the x-axis shows the de-
lay times from 1 milliseconds to 2000 milliseconds and the y-axis illustrates the
percentages of 0 bits observed at each delay time. As can be seen, Figure 3.3 is
divided in to three regions (Flip, Fluctuation, and Startup). Specifically, we note
that before the DRAMs settle into their startup values where the data is quite
stable, the DRAM values somewhat ”overshoot” in that slightly more bits flip to 0
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Write
11111111111111111111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111
11111111111111111111111111111111
Delay(1) D1
Read(1)
11111110111110111011111111101011
11111010111110111111011110111111
11110111111111101111110111011111
Delay(2) D2 
.
.
.
11001010100101010010101001001101
10100101010100110011010010100011
01101000110110000101010001001010
Read(n)
11100101100101101000101000100011
01110100000100110101101100010000
01011000110001101010000110110101
Read(m)
“Settling down to Startup value”
a)
b)
c)
d)
Fig. 3.2: Real data snippets that illustrate the DDR2 SDRAM operations: a)
Write. b) Delay(1). c) Read(1). d) Read(m).
before flipping back to 1 in the startup state. We call this region the ”fluctuation”
region. In the following subsections, we will discuss and model the three distinct
regions.
• Flip Region: During the flip Region, the percentage of flip bits increases
from below 1% to 56% as the delay time goes from 1 milliseconds up to 350
milliseconds. We showed 5 measurements at each delay time, and showed
the percentage of bit flip with an error bar. In total, we performed 175
measurements in this region. Using MATLAB cftool, we draw the fit data
that is represented by the red line. The fit equation is a Linear model
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Equation with the below specifications:
b0 = 0.211t− 5.909 (3.1)
where t is the delay time, and b0 is the expected number of zero bits at each
delay time within the Flip-Region.
• Fluctuation Region: The Fluctuation Region starts from 350 milliseconds
and ends at 1180 milliseconds. This region has more variations and most
of our measurements are focused on this region. In total, we took 168
measurements in this region. The percentage of bit flips ranges from 58%
to 64% which is more than the percentage of ’0’s at startup. That indicates
that there are more ’0’s in the fluctuation region than the startup. This
unexpected phenomenon became the focus of our investigation. A potential
cause for this unexpected behavior is the temperature effect that we will
discuss more about it in Section 3.1.3. The expected data of this region
is drawn by a red line and the fit equation is a Linear model as seen with
Equation 3.2.
b0 = 3.744e
−5t+ 61.27 (3.2)
• (3). Startup Region: Finally, the Startup Region is where the DRAM’s
behavior settles down to its expected startup behavior. This region is where
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the delay goes from around 1200 milliseconds and beyond. The linear model
of this region is as follows:
b0 = 0.0002923t+ 56.3 (3.3)
Fig. 3.3: Our DRAM Remanence based TRNG Model using MATLAB Curve
Fitting Tool (CFTool).
Impact of Temperature on DRAM Remanence
Previous works have characterized DRAM and SRAMs memory remanence as a
function of temperature. In fact, there is a correlation between DRAM remanence
and DRAM temperature. Temperature plays an important role in data remanence
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time and the amount of bit flips [83] by affects power leakage at the transistor level.
Particularly in DRAM, it significantly decreased with increasing the operation
temperature of the System-on-Chip (SoC). For this reason, we also tried to test
DDR2 SDRAMs in a high temperature condition. When the temperature goes
up, the more bits flip and the remanence time is much shorter. In other words,
at high temperatures, the degradation process is accelerated and is very soon.
On the other hand, the cooler the memory, the less bits flip and memory can
retain its data for a longer period of time. Therefore the rate of RAM decay is
largely a function of temperature. This poses a serious threat to hardware which
operates with secret information (typically security key) in a secure environment.
We obtained 5 measurements at some delay time in the Fluctuation Region. We
measured the DRAM package temperature after the first measurement and it was
28 ◦C. However, the temperature of the package after the 5th measurement was
55 ◦C. Note that the package surface temperature is not the actual temperature at
the die - which will be much hotter. Based on the experiments, the percentage of
flip bits at the 5th measurement was much higher than the first one. For example,
in one sets of 5 measurement continuously, the first measurement has around 58%
flip bits, but the 5th measurement had almost 64% flip bits at the same delay time,
since the DRAM is much hotter at 5th measurement than the first measurement.
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3.1.4 Potential Attacks
Remanence characterization results can be used to build secure memories that are
less vulnerable to various attacks. Cold boot attack is such an example that makes
use of the property that the remanence effect is prolonged by cooling down RAM
chips. Cold boot attacks rely on DRAM remanence that allow keys to be recovered
from memory even after a machine has been powered down. These attacks can
retrieve unencrypted data from RAM; The cold boot attack requires physical
access to the machine, a boot disk (or specialized hardware), and quick timing
(as data remains resident in RAM for only a short time after its powered down).
The extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence
times can be increased dramatically with simple cooling techniques [31].
3.1.5 Data Analysis and Evaluation
Here, we present the method of extracting random bit sequences from our TRNG,
the uniqueness of the data generated from the designed TRNG, and finally the
results of NIST statistical tests for the randomness of the data.
Producing Random Number Generation
Given the data we collected, the next step is to extract random numbers from the
data. Our initial attempt was to select an arbitrary delay time during the fluctu-
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ation region, and use the memory that was read at that time as our set of random
data. However, our analysis found that this data did not reliably generate suitably
random data. The data was heavily biased with approximately 60% of bits be-
ing 0. As a secondary approach, we examined the differences between fluctuation
and startup regions. Simply taking an XOR of the data returns the differential
bits from the two regions. In the fluctuation region, we had 168 measurements
and these were XOR’ed with a measurement taken from the startup region. Note
that the startup region measurements were stable, so we only compared with one
measurement from the startup region. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the
168 measurements taken from the Fluctuation Region XOR’ed with the measure-
ments collected from the Startup Region. The mean of percentage of 1s among
the 168 measurements is 0.5090 which is close to 0.5, the ideal case. The standard
deviation of the data is 0.0201 and because it is close to zero, indicates that the
data points tend to be very close to the mean of the sets of our measurements.
As shown, the shape of the histogram clearly illustrates that the distribution of
1s and 0s is close to normal distribution. Therefore the distribution indicates
that DRAM clearly demonstrates the characteristics of a TRNG as it relates to
randomness. We were also interested in the distribution of XOR’ed data relative
to the delay time (Figure 3.5). We can see that the data is centered around 50%
as expected. Moreover, other than the first 200 ms, the variation is not time de-
73
pendent either, meaning that one could select any measurement in the fluctuation
region to use as our random data generator.
Fig. 3.4: The histogram of the XORed data between Fluctuation and Startup
regions.
Investigating Uniqueness of the Data
Since we have a finite set of data, when we regenerate the data, we might get
the same set of bits again and that is a security vulnerability because if someone
was able to break into the nonvolatile storage where the random bits are stored,
they know the sequence of random bits even if we regenerate the bits. For these
reasons, we did some experiments where we could generate two different sets of
random bits from two different data points from the fluctuation region. Then
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Fig. 3.5: Scatter plot of percentage of ’1’s of XOR’ed data that are taken from
Fluctuation and Startup regions.
compared these sets of random bits to see how different they are. Based on our
results shown in Figure 3.6, we can always get new sets of random bits. The mean
of the value and the standard deviation are 0.4969 and 0.0344, respectively.
NIST Statistical Test Suite Results
The NIST statistical test suite is used to evaluate the ”randomness” of the bit
strings produced by DRAM cells. Based on this test, we can determine whether a
data set has a recognizable pattern or the process that has been generated is sig-
nificantly random. The NIST Test Suite (NTS) is a statistical package consisting
of different types of tests to evaluate the randomness of binary sequences. Each
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Fig. 3.6: The histogram of the Uniqueness of the data at Fluctuation Region.
statistical test is employed to calculate a P-value that shows the randomness of
the given sequences based on that test. If a P-value for a test is determined to
be equal to 1, then the sequence appears to have perfect randomness. A p-value
>= 0.01 (normally 1%) would means that sequence would be considered to be ran-
dom with a confidence of 99% [87]. To evaluate our collected data from DRAM,
we apply NIST tests to the differential bits as discussed in subsection 3.1.5. Ta-
ble 3.1 displays the average results of a suite of 15 performed NIST tests at room
temperature. Table 3.1 shows that all the NIST tests p-value are greater than
0.01, this indicates that the measurements pass the requirements for randomness.
We also applied NIST tests to the data gathered at high temperature. For space
reasons, we do not show the NIST results, but even at high temperature con-
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Table 3.1: NIST Statistical Tests Results at Room Temperature Condition.
NIST Tests P-value Result
Frequency 0.6247 passed
Block Frequency 0.6734 passed
Runs 0.7731 passed
Longest Run 0.6457 passed
Cumulative Sums 0.7035 passed
Rank 0.8241 passed
FFT 0.4872 passed
Linear Complexity 0.6576 passed
Overlapping Template 0.5594 passed
Non Overlapping Template 0.9184 passed
Approximate Entropy 0.6943 passed
Universal Statistical Test 0.4208 passed
Random Excursions Variant 0.5557 passed
Random Excursions 0.2843 passed
Serial 0.5208 passed
dition, the data streams passed the NIST tests and high temperature does not
have effect on the randomness of the data even though it has a huge impact on
the remanence time and decay rate. Note that we were able to get 420 Kbit of
data from 1 Mbit of DRAM cells (XOR’ed of data from Fluctuation Region and
Startup Region). Therefore, extrapolating to a system with 8 GB of memory, we
could generate approximately 3 GB of random data.
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3.2 DRAM-based Random Number Generation using its Startup
Value Behavior
3.2.1 DRAM Startup Value Behavior
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that DRAMs surprisingly have startup values -
i.e. non-zero values when the DRAM is powered on. While older DRAMs may
show potential as a PUF, our work with modern DDR DRAMs show that they not
satisfy criteria to serve as a PUF. Specifically, these startup value patterns were
neither random or reliable. However, we will show that DDR DRAMs can still be
used to generate random numbers. Using a variety of correction mechanisms, we
are able to improve the randomness of the numbers such that they pass the NIST
tests. Further work will investigate the suitability of the approach on a variety of
DRAM parts.
3.2.2 Experimental Setup
Our experiment involved using the on-board MIRA P3R1GE3EGF G8E DDR2
on the Diligent Atlys board. (Xilinx Spartan 6 FPGA). The FPGA hardware was
configured to transfer the memory data through a serial port at startup. A serial
terminal was then used to record the bits and write them to a text file.
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Fig. 3.7: Small section of the bitmap from DRAM for trial 3.
3.2.3 Data Analysis and Results
The use of newer DRAMs for PUFs has tremendous promise because of the large
memory space, but it also contains large potential drawbacks. In our experiments,
we found the startup values show a clear bias that reflects the architecture of the
DRAM. In addition, not all trials produce adequate results. At times, the startup
values are completely non-random yielding no valid data to be used for a PUF.
More research is needed to see what is exactly causing the DRAM to start-up
to these modes and if it can be avoided. Thus multiple trials will be needed to
ensure that the bits are behaving correctly upon startup. We show a graphical
representation of a sample bitmap from various trials in Figures 3.7, and 3.8. Each
row in the Figure represents 8192 bits where white is 0 and black is 1. Across the
whole device, clear patterns could be seen when mapping the data to a bit map.
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Fig. 3.8: Small section of the bitmap from DRAM for trial 6.
The architecture of the DRAM is what is likely strongly influences this style of
DRAM. These patterns can be observed across multiple trials. This particular
DRAM alternate between ones and zeros every 16 bits consistent with the DRAM
16-bit width. Every four megabits, the DRAM has a section of 32 bits before
returning to its pattern. Figure 3.7 shows a small subsection of the bitmap of one
of the trials on the DRAM. The pattern described above is heavily noticeable in
the figure. However, not every trial gives these results. Some of the trials had
far less stable bits and the patterns were less obvious. In Figure 3.8, you can see
the a much larger percentage of bits that don’t follow the pattern compared to
Figure 3.7. In Figure 3.8 despite the higher variance it bits, the original pattern
is still easily discernible to the human eye despite the significantly larger number
of bits that do not follow the pattern. Of the six trials, Figure 3.7 appeared to
follow the pattern the best while the trial from Figure 3.8 followed the pattern
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the least. The other trials were anywhere in-between. Another interesting result
comes when one looks at how the pattern starts. In Figures 3.7 and 3.8, one can
observe that the pattern starts with 16 bits of zeros first before alternating to 16
bits of ones. However this is not always the case.
In other trials, the pattern starts off with 16 bits of ones instead of zeros!
So not only is each trial unique and unpredictable with which and how many bits
will be affected, a completely inverted pattern can also be achieved. Clearly, the
use of DDR DRAM as a PUF is unlikely. With 1 Gbit of memory read, there
appears to be no sections on the DRAM that produce both unique and stable
bits to be used to generate challenge response pairs. This unpredictability helps
us however. Which bits and how many bits that remain stable were extremely
unpredictable from trial to trial. Therefore it would be possible to xor multiple
trials to introduce the random bits from multiple trials. By xoring multiple trials,
we can combine the unpredictability in the bits that do not follow the set patterns.
Thus introducing more trials to xor would likely make the results better. It is
unlikely that the entire or even a majority of the DRAM can yields random data
by xoring multiple trials. However several sections likely will pass randomness
tests. The more trials that are included, the more sections will pass. However
when xoring 4 different trials together, we get that 1.29% of the blocks pass all
the tests. With a 1 Gbit DRAM, this gives us approximately 1.65 MB of random
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bits that we can use for a secure random code.
NIST Test
As seen in Table 3.2, xoring the trials gives significantly higher passing rates for
some of the later tests that were producing insufficient number of passing blocks.
More importantly when you look at the percent of passing all tests, we finally
achieve blocks that pass every test.
Van Neumann Corrector
Another approach is to apply the Von Neumann Corrector [55] on all the pairs of
bits. This works by discarding all 00 and 11 pairs and correcting a 10 to a 1 and
a 01 to a 0. Since such a large part of the data has 16 bits of ones or zeros in a
row, we can essentially remove such sections and only look at the unstable bits.
After applying the corrector, we again used blocks of 65536 bits, and we tested
the maximum number of blocks allowed by the new block size. The remaining
bits that did not fit into a full 65536-bit block were ignored. Discarding these
bits reduced the number of random bits available. Table 3.2 shows the result
of using the Von Neumann approach. As expected, the amount of data that is
available to select a random key is greatly reduced. Of the six trials, the largest
key space is 35.1MB or 27.4% of the original DRAM and with the smallest at
9MB or 7.0% of the original DRAM. However, the approach shows some promise
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Table 3.2: DRAM trials and corresponding NIST tests
NIST Test Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4
Frequency 4.99% 7.48% 31.97% 1.13%
BlockFrequency 19.20% 79.84% 95.61% 19.72%
CumulativeSums 4.98% 7.87% 33.29% 1.12%
CumulativeSums 5.28% 8.63% 33.31% 1.23%
Runs 2.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09%
LongestRun 16.91% 0.00% 0.00% 5.54%
FFT 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
ApproximateEntropy 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Serial 27.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01%
Serial 95.11% 0.00% 0.00% 5.93%
Pass all tests 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 1,3 xor Trial 1,4,5,6 xor
Frequency 9.20% 0.20% 0.00% 13.12%
BlockFrequency 35.29% 88.92% 0.02% 19.55%
CumulativeSums1 9.42% 0.20% 0.00% 13.19%
CumulativeSums2 9.71% 0.21% 0.00% 13.24%
Runs 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 18.84%
LongestRun 0.19% 0.18% 0.78% 27.38%
FFT 0.00% 0.41% 1.96% 75.42%
ApproximateEntropy 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 26.14%
Serial1 0.00% 0.00% 29.95% 64.87%
Serial2 0.02% 0.07% 91.88% 95.41%
Pass all tests 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.29%
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with respect to randomness in that it does significantly better than the raw trial
results. Unfortunately, it fails the vast majority of the runs tests. Either the bits
are changing alternating between runs of ones and zeros too often or not often
enough. Since the pattern switches every 16 bits, trials with a large number of
unstable bits might alternate too slowly because if it has too many outliers in a
16 bit section. This is supported by looking at the data size of the Von Neumann
corrector output.
The two smallest datasets (Trials 2 and 3) had the best performance on the
limiting test, the runs test. This is important to note because the Von Neumann
corrector is designed to remove sections of the data that do not have significant
number of outliers. Thus, it seems that with less outliers they are more random.
Perhaps the more unstable bits there are, the more predictable they become. We
come to this conclusion because without any unstable bits, the entire data set
would be removed. Thus, the more unstable bits, the larger the trials will be
after applying the Von Neumann corrector. Because the smaller trials performed
better, its possible that as more unstable bit show up, they are heavily biased in
locations leading to a less random result. A greater number of outliers or unstable
bits leading to less random data after the Von Neumann correction is somewhat
unexpected. However, this interesting paradox can be solved by combining mul-
tiple trials by xoring them. If sections of the unstable bits become predictable, it
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Table 3.3: DRAM trials with Von Neumann corrector
Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3
Data size 35.1MB 12.8MB 9.0MB
Frequency 97.09% 75.91% 71.97%
BlockFrequency 99.98% 99.39% 98.08%
CumulativeSums 97.68% 78.05% 74.11%
CumulativeSums 97.74% 77.80% 74.05%
Runs 0.11% 1.94% 12.31%
LongestRun 37.06% 60.08% 77.95%
FFT 96.48% 98.16% 98.54%
ApproximateEntropy 19.46% 51.07% 72.22%
Serial 95.91% 97.20% 98.22%
Serial 98.64% 98.78% 98.86%
Pass all tests 0.0350% 0.6248% 5.5974%
Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6
Data size 28.3MB 24.0MB 34.6MB
Frequency 93.46% 89.85% 96.21%
BlockFrequency 100% 99.92% 99.99%
CumulativeSums 94.62% 91.50% 97.05%
CumulativeSums 94.66% 91.48% 96.95%
Runs 0% 0.02% .02%
LongestRun 24.22% 17.76% 29.13%
FFT 96.40% 96.24% 95.47%
ApproximateEntropy 16.81% 11.14% 11.39%
Serial 27.13% 94.95% 94.90%
Serial 95.11% 98.62% 98.58%
Pass all tests 0.00% 0.0085% 0.00%
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will be canceled out by the unstable bits from other trials. Looking at results of
xoring trials and then performing Von Neumann corrector (Table 3.4), we see a
much higher pass rate. The resulting data were all very similar in size with all of
them falling in the 25-27% of the original file. All trials had at least 56% of trials
pass every test. This is a huge improvement upon earlier results. The best trial
for just using the corrector resulted in 5.6% of trails passing and xored trials best
resulted in 1.29%.
Combining Two-methods
Combining these two methods clearly can be used to generate random keys from
the unstable bits. Our results can generate at a minimum 15.12% and a maximum
20.45% of usable random bits. With 1 Gbit of memory to choose from, 15-20% is
a sufficiently large enough to generate a secure random key. Also with xoring the
trials, we had to xor 4 different trials before getting a small amount of bitstreams
to pass. Although xoring more trials produced better results, with this method
we saw sufficient results from just xoring two different trials. As demonstrated
earlier, the DRAMs have patterns in there startup behavior. Moreover, these
patterns are not consistent, as they differ greatly from trial to trial. It is possible
that the DRAM has a certain number of startup states or modes that it can enter.
Comparing the different trials, two of them had 94.14% of the bits in common. It is
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Table 3.4: DRAM trials XOR with Von Neumann corrector
Trial 1,2 xor Trial 1,3 xor Trial 1,2,4,5 xor
File size 34.4MB 33.3MB 33.9MB
Frequency 94.71% 94.73% 95.61%
BlockFrequency 99.43% 99.32% 99.11%
CumulativeSums 95.33% 95.34% 96.08%
CumulativeSums 95.31% 95.21% 96.11%
Runs 80.67% 85.13% 93.80%
LongestRun 94.34% 96.20% 97.70%
FFT 98.53% 98.69% 98.77%
ApproximateEntropy 80.87% 85.70% 89.95%
Serial 98.49% 98.55% 98.70%
Serial 98.94% 99.00% 98.90%
Pass all tests 56.29% 62.61% 74.81%
Trial 1,3,4,6 xor Trial 1,4,5,6 xor Trial 1,2,3,4,5,6 xor
File size 33.1MB 33.0MB 33.6MB
Frequency 93.42% 93.80% 95.02%
BlockFrequency 99.42% 97.35% 98.51%
CumulativeSums 94.25% 94.46% 95.55%
CumulativeSums 94.19% 94.34% 95.41%
Runs 82.90% 95.82% 97.80%
LongestRun 95.40% 98.26% 98.66%
FFT 98.67% 98.90% 98.74%
ApproximateEntropy 85.49% 91.13% 91.92%
Serial 98.64% 98.76% 98.88%
Serial 98.98% 99.06% 98.96%
Pass all tests 59.70% 73.40% 77.92%
87
entirely possible that the remaining ≈6% is just unstable bits from this particular
startup mode.
Supporting the theory on startup modes, the 16-bit pattern sometimes starts
bits set to one and sometimes the bits set to zero. This means a section of mostly
stable bits can be all ones one trial and all zeros the next, making it highly likely
that some sort of modes exist. More testing is needed to see if reason for the
inconsistent numbers and distribution of unstable bits can be determined. The
DRAM having a startup mode: would not completely hinder its application. It
would reduce the number of challenges, but an attacker would have no way to
know which mode it is using and would be unable to recreate the seed state.
If the mode can be determined the DRAM would be less secure for generating
random numbers. This would allow an attacker with physical access to replicate
the seed state. Furthermore all of this behavior is untested and unconfirmed in
other DRAMs of the same type. More testing is needed to determine if the startup
values are based on modes and if other DRAM have modes and if so do the modes
behave the same as the DRAM we tested. Despite these challenges, the DRAM
might still have application in cybersecurity.
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3.3 Potential Attacks
Tests will need to be preformed on more devices to see if they a perform similarly.
If all DDR DRAM behave in this way, the only way for an attacker to reproduce
a key would be with physical access to the device that was used to generate the
key. This ability to reproduce is also limited with the varying amount of amounts
of unstable bits in each trial. Further if we choose to xor the trials and apply
the Von Neumann corrector, it would become even harder to for an adversary to
reproduce the results without knowing the details of each trial that was xor’ed.
It is possible for an attacker with knowledge of the memory architecture to probe
a DRAM and learn the factors that cause the varying amount of unstable bits.
However, this would have little benefit to the attacker, as there is no standard for
error in a key. An attacker correctly predicting 90% of the bits won’t help as one
wrong bit is all that is needed to deny the attacker access.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, We propose a new method for generating hardware true ran-
dom number generators and studied the potential of using remanence effect of
the DRAM cells for constructing a high quality TRNG. Our new constructed
TRNG has all the characteristics of a strong TRNG and the approach to build
this new TRNG is completely novel and concise. The results from NIST Tests
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clearly shows that the remanence based DRAM TRNG is a promising candidate
for cryptographic systems. We also investigated the high temperature effect on
data remanence and randomness of the data. Our results shows that even at high
temperature, the measurements pass the requirements for randomness. We also
demonstrated the use of DRAM startup values to produce a TRNG. It has been
shown that DRAM startup values have potential as a physical unclonable func-
tion (PUF). However, in our tests using a newer DDR2 DRAM, we demonstrate
that the startup values are not suitable for device authentication but they do
have use for creating random keys. We have developed an approach to extract
random numbers from the DRAM startup values. Finally, we assessed and tested
the randomness of selected data by applying the NIST Statistical Test.
Chapter 4
A Study of Power Supply Variation as a Source of
Random Noise
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the construction of True Random Numbers Gener-
ators (TRNGs) using variations in power supplies. We demonstrate that power
supply line outputs do not have a constant voltage and the variations in voltage
follow a normal distribution. These variations can be used to create truly ran-
dom bits that demonstrates a high entropy rate based on the results obtained
from the NIST Statistical Test Suite. In order to quantify the impact of varia-
tions on the input signal of a circuit, we analyze the impact of such variations
using Monte- Carlo simulations as well as an actual implementation. Results were
obtained for evaluating the accuracy and randomness of the data gathered from
our proposed circuit. A detailed analysis of the effect of variations of different
power supplies is also presented with observations on their usefulness as a TRNG.
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The key advantage of our power supply variation based TRNG is its simplicity of
implementation.
4.2 Challenges, Motivations, and Objectives
In this Chapter, the effects of voltage variations inherent to power supplies are
examined. We focused more on studying the impact of power supply noise on
the behavior of VLSI circuits (inverters chain). Our TRNG model is increasingly
sensitive to supply voltage noise. Investigation of the variation on power supplies
for constructing TRNGs yielded some unique advantages: 1). First, our proposed
TRNG model purely relies on the input voltage variation that is coming from the
power supply. However, other TRNG models, such as the Ring Oscillator (RO)
based TRNG, are not only influenced power supply variation, but also affected by a
variety of other properties, so it is hard to say what exactly is causing variations in
the RO TRNG model. In fact, a lot of variations are based on timing variations.
2). Our model is a very simple circuit to build, so it does not add significant
overhead (cost, voltage, etc,) to the system’s normal operation. 3). Our simple
circuit can continuously generate bits unlike a memory based TRNG where a fixed
number of bit strings are generated.
Challenges: In the work by Stipcˇevic´ and Koc¸‘ [92] they mentioned that the
majority of TRNGs models, whose speed is at least 1 Mbit/sec, are too expensive
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to implement and far too bulky to make practical. As the need for practical
TRNG solutions grows with our utilization of TRNGs in everyday devices and
practices, there is a desire to minimize the cost required for implementation of
these models. These concerns culminate as a challenge to produce a low-cost and
practical design implementation for noise-based TRNGs.
Motivations: General TRNGs are constrained by two major issues: (1) that
they are too expensive to implement and (2) they tend to be bulky and not
efficient. Our work focuses on presenting a low-cost TRNG solution, in terms of
overheard and design expenditures that can provide a large number of random
bits and is very easy and simple to implement. A potential boon of centralizing
the TRNG around power-supply noise is that we could create a model that works
as a constant generator for bit strings.
Objectives: The primary objective of our work is to create a simple true
RNG based on power source noise and variation that has the least cost, in terms
of area overhead and additional electronic circuit elements, and provides good
randomness. In order to achieve our goal, we proposed a dynamic voltage feedback
tuning system that allows for practical implementation. By adding the feedback
loop we provide stability to the system while removing human error from the
process, creating a robust and self-correcting design.
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4.3 Power Supply Noise under Study
The variations in power supplies have risen to become one of the most important
challenges and a higher level of concern as technology has scaled down in new
digital designs. Due to the trends of higher switching speeds, more active pins
per package, a decrease in supply voltage required for ICs, and more finely tuned
circuit characteristics there is a much larger ratio of the peak noise voltage to the
ideal supply voltage. Nominal supply voltage is gradually scaling down with newer
technologies, but threshold voltage scaling has all but stopped. Consequently,
circuit delay sensitivity to the margins is increasing with each technology node.
Power supply noise is primarily a voltage drop in power distribution networks
resulting in different voltages at different parts of the same chip. Two of the
reasons contributing to these behavior variations are the resistive and inductive
voltage drops across power supply networks. An example of this behavior would
be the activity of any switches in the device circuitry. As the switch opens and
closes, this action causes power be pulled or driven which results in a fluctuation
of the power causing noise.
4.4 Dynamic Variation in Power Supplies vs Voltage Regulators
To determine a Gaussian distribution, which is a factor of proving the non-
cyclostationary behavior of the power supplies, we take a look at the math and
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Fig. 4.1: Histograms of a portion of the data (10000 samples) directly from six
different power sources (Bench power supply, USB, Computer power
source, DC power supply).
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Fig. 4.2: Input voltage plot of 1-second (240 samples) of the data from 6 different
power supplies.
96
2.2 2.22 2.24 2.26 2.28 2.3 2.32 2.34
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Voltage (V)
C
o
u
n
t
LT3501EFE#PBF 
Voltage Regulator
Mean: 2.2658
STD:  0.0099
FFT: 0.2348
HZmvn: 0.0000
0 50 100 150 200 250
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
time (1-second)
V
in
LT3501EFE#PBF Voltage Regulator
(a) (b)
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samples) of the data.
theory behind this definition. A Gaussian distribution [X ∼ N (µ, σ2) ] in a vari-
ant X with mean µ (or expectation of the distribution) and variance σ2 (σ is
standard deviation) is a statistical distribution with probability density function:
P (x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 (4.1)
In order to prove that the noise from power supplies are not periodic and
cyclostationary, we examined six different power sources which are listed in Ta-
ble 4.1. For each power source, we took 10,000 samples (at 240 samples/second)
and their distributions are shown in Figure 4.1. The reason for the 240 sam-
ples/second is that we read data at a baud rate of 9600 (i.e. 9600 bits/second).
Since each byte of data requires 10bits to send and we required 4 characters per
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data sample the rate is effectively 240 samples/second. The data collected for
Figure 4.1 was done using an Arduino to capture signals directly from each power
supply. Previous work by Burleson and Mirza [13] claimed that signals from a
power supply are cyclostationary. In our analysis of power signal data, however,
we found that the sample distribution is in-fact non-cyclostationary and does not
cyclically vary in time. As can be seen in the figures, the Mean, Standard devia-
tion (STD), Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), and HZmvn of the sample sets have
been calculated. Our FFT metric from the NIST test [87] gives values that range
from 0.5872 to 0.7123 showing that there there are no determinable cyclic pat-
terns. Note that Henze-Zirkler’s Multivariate Normality (HZmvn) test is based
on a non-negative functional distance that measures the distance between two
distribution functions: the characteristic function of the multivariate normality
and the empirical characteristic function. This test can confirm that analyzed
data has a normal distribution if the p-value associated with the Henze-Zirkler
statistic is greater than 0.05 [39]. Based on the metrics that have been calculated
for these distributions, it is clear that the power sources demonstrate a standard
Gaussian process. Examining Figure 4.1 one can easily see that the calculated
values for the power sources all fall within acceptable range. Figure 4.2 shows the
time domain plot of the data gathered from the investigated power supplies. The
x-axis and y-axis show 1-second of the time and output voltage, respectively. As
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can be seen in this figure, the power supplies are not showing a constant 2.5V but
also have continuous variation in their voltage waveforms. Note that we did not
make the initial assumption that the power supplies were ideal and instead begin
with the assumption that the power supplies create a deterministic output. It was
only after experimental measurements, which included the effect of internal resis-
tance of the power supplies, that we found that the output produced a stochastic
component.
Power Source Output
Voltage
MASTECH HY3005F Bench Power Supply 2.5V
Agilent E3630A Bench Power Supply 2.5V
Agilent E3647A Bench Power Supply 2.5V
Dell CX305N-00 Computer Power Supply 2.5V
Dell 06TM1C DC Laptop Adapter 19.5V
E238846 USB Cable attached to Dell PC 5V
Table 4.1: Power sources under evaluation
Similar to the experiments we did for proving non-cyclostationary behavior
of the power sources, we repeated the same procedure with a voltage regulator
(LT3501EFE#PBF). As shown in Figure 4.3 (a), the calculations for STD, FFT,
and HZmvn are much lower than those of the other six power supplies examined.
The most glaring issue is that the HZmvn value is 0.0000, which is far below the
0.05 threshold required. Furthermore, the spread of data is very narrow which
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Fig. 4.4: A schematic of our TRNG circuit design.
indicates the STD value is very small. Figure 4.3 (b) shows input voltage plot
of 1-second (240 samples) of the data from the voltage regulator which has a
very small variation of less that 0.02 at most. Based on these figures (4.3 (a)
& 4.3 (b)) we can conclude that the data from the voltage regulator does not
have enough variation to be used for random number generation. While the
results of the voltage regulator in Figure 4.3 (a) appears to match the Gaussian
properties desired, deeper investigation of Figure 4.3 (b) reveals that there is not
enough variance to be suitable for generating TRNG. Without sufficient variance,
it becomes difficult to extract noise differentials in order to produce random bits.
The behavior of the voltage regulator is not surprising, since the purpose of the
voltage regulator is to provide a stable voltage output.
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(a)
(b)
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Fig. 4.5: Plots of output voltage vs the number of samples while using (a) 1-inv,
(b) 2-inv, (c)3-inv, and (d) 4-inv in chain using Monte Carlo simulation.
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4.5 Preliminary Power Supply-based TRNG Circuit Model
The noise generated by the various power supplies shows promise based on our
measurements shown in the previous section. However, in order to construct a
TRNG, we needed to design a circuit capable of taking as input the signal coming
from a power supply and generating a series of random bits. While the noise
from power sources is non-periodic and non-deterministic, the circuit element is
required to convert the Gaussian distribution into uniform distributed sequences
of 0’s and 1’s. Since the Gaussian distribution is centered at the mean, i.e. half
of the distribution is greater than the mean and half is less than the mean, our
circuit only need discriminate between voltages above and below the mean; to
produce strings of 0’s and 1’s. In other words, this circuit element is responsible
for the conversion of analog behavior to digital behavior based on a predetermined
threshold. Passing the signal through an inverter should provide the necessary
discrimination assuming that the power supply mean is equal to the transition
point of the inverter. For a balanced inverter, this point is VDD
2
. However, since
the input is very close to VDD
2
, the output of an inverter will still be very close to
VDD
2
as well. To counteract this, instead of a single inverter, we propose using a
chain of inverters. These inverters act as amplifiers to amplify the input variations
and push the output away from VDD
2
to 0 and VDD. By using the chain of inverters,
we are able to amplify the discrimination spread of voltage readings. Figure 4.4
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shows a schematic of our primary TRNG circuit design. The purpose of the chain
of inverters is to transform the analog signal into a digital form. As indicated
earlier, the role of the inverters is to amplify the input signal and to “convert” its
value into a binary representation; to 1’s & 0’s. Based on our observation after
implementing the circuit, we found that the greater the number of inverters in
the inverter chain, the better the accuracy we get out of the circuit. “Accuracy”
is defined as the displacement between the two Gaussian peaks for the purpose of
having voltages appear in one of two extreme ranges (e.g. 0V, 5V). Accuracy is
measured as a percentage of all recorded outputs that meet the ideal case. The
voltage divider is kept for the non-bench power supplies in order to bring the
voltage close to 2.5V.
4.5.1 Simulation Results
Figure 4.5 clearly demonstrates the effects of an increasing number of inverters on
the percentages of the accuracy of the output. In this figure, the x-axis represents
the voltage levels from 0-5V and the y-axis shows the number of readings that
registered that voltage level. Figure 4.5 (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the simula-
tion result, while considering the design with one, two, three, and four inverters
using OrCAD Capture’s Monte Carlo simulation. One should note that x-axis
in Figure 4.5 (a) is at a shorter range compare to (b), (c) and (d) in order to
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better illustrate the accuracy of the output. In all, by increasing the number of
inverters in chain the mean value will come close to the ideal case which is 2.5
and standard deviation will become larger. This shows that we can completely
distinguish between zeros and ones generated from our proposed model.
4.5.2 Implementation Results
Using the graphs in Figure 4.6, we can visually select the ideal voltage that will
provide the desired 50% 1’s for the TRNG for each examined power supply. While
50% 1’s is a necessary property of a TRNG, it is not a sufficient metric of random-
ness. We, therefore, use the NIST Statistical Test Suite to assess the randomness
in a long sequence of bits [87]. NIST has documented 15 statistical tests, and for
each test the χ-square variation (χ2) of a particular parameter for the given bit se-
quence is compared with that obtained from the theoretical studies of an identical
sequence under the assumption of randomness. The χ2 data is used to generate a
p-value which is the probability that an ideal random number generation would
produce a sequence less random than the sequence under test. A p-value >= 0.01
would mean that sequence would be considered to be random with a confidence
of 99% [87]. Table 4.2 shows the results of applying NIST tests to our data using
6 different power supplies. Each power supply’s results came from the 4 and 5
inverters chain measurements. As shown in Table 4.2, our data collected for our
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TRNG model passed all 15 tests successfully.
At first glance, our simple TRNG circuit may look similar to that of a Ring
Oscillator (RO) TRNG circuit. However they are completely different in terms
of source of variation and even the circuit structure. A ring oscillator is a device
composed of an odd number of logical inverters whose output oscillates between
the two logical levels. The inverters are attached in a chain, where the output of
the last inverter is fed back into the first; causing oscillation. Our TRNG circuit
architecture only incorporates a power supply as input and a chain of inverters
without any form of feedback. In further comparison, the source of variation in
an RO TRNG is due to inherent oscillator jitter that causes timing differences
and metastability in registered outputs. For our model, however, the variations
originate from the power supply and we use several inverters to amplify that
variation. The only similarity between these two TRNG implementations is the
chain of inverters.
While we were able to demonstrate good results from our primary TRNG
circuit design, it still has practical limitations due to the need to ensure that
the input voltage is centered around VDD
2
. To overcome this limitation we add a
feedback system to allow for better robustness of the system, as we will show in
the following Section.
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Fig. 4.6: Percentages of 1’s at different input voltage level (0-5 volts) after using
different number of inverters in inverter chain (1-5 inverters) from 6
different power supplies.
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4.5.3 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup essentially consists of four parts: the power source, a
chain of inverters comprised of 7404 TTL inverters, an FPGA to sample the data
bits and a host PC for collection. Using TTL 7404 series inverters, we considered
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 inverters for the inverter chain, tested each condition and collected
the data from the circuit to analyze the results. The FPGA samples data using a
register clocked at 100MHz. Figure 4.6 shows the results we have obtained from
using a different number of inverters in the inverter chain. The x-axis indicates
the input voltages (0-5 V) supplied to our simple circuit and the y-axis indicates
the percentage of value 1s in accordance with a certain input voltage. Figure 4.6
can clearly demonstrate the effect of additional inverters attached to each of the
six different power supplies. These figures show that as the number of inverters
in the chain increase, there is a greater divergence on the percentage of 0’s and
1’s collected.
4.6 Advanced Power Supply-based TRNG Model using Tuning
System
4.6.1 Tuning System
Normally, electrical circuits are designed to operate with a constant and un-
changed range of voltages, making use of the physical property of a circuit in
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Table 4.2: NIST Statistical Tests Suite average p-value results of our proposed
TRNGs using different types of power supplies.
NIST Tests
p-value
MASTECH
HY3005F
p-value
Agilent E3630A
p-value
Agilent E3647A
p-value
CX305N-00 Dell
p-value
06TM1C Dell
p-value
USB
E238846
Frequency 0.6454 0.6791 0.7488 0.7293 0.5541 0.6923
Block Frequency 0.4572 0.5583 0.5429 0.8536 0.6402 0.7538
Runs 0.7290 0.5283 0.6203 0.6370 0.4721 0.7199
Longest Run 0.6212 0.6502 0.5826 0.7196 0.5836 0.7044
Cumulative Sums 0.7129 0.8094 0.9360 0.8854 0.8107 0.7547
Rank 0.7721 0.5408 0.7963 0.6628 0.7157 0.3845
FFT 0.8129 0.7553 0.6952 0.8562 0.7735 0.5805
Linear Complexity 0.7334 0.8973 0.8502 0.9163 0.8490 0.8068
Overlapping Template 0.6973 0.5098 0.5663 0.4725 0.6829 0.5812
Non Overlapping Template 0.7420 0.4579 0.5538 0.6390 0.7712 0.5403
Approximate Entropy 0.5641 0.7673 0.9552 0.8854 0.9526 0.8882
Universal Statistical Test 0.4519 0.5236 0.4797 0.6188 0.6482 0.3214
Random Excursions Variant 0.5911 0.3829 0.7122 0.8375 0.5594 0.8604
Random Excursions 0.8523 0.6574 0.6781 0.8953 0.6683 0.6950
Serial 0.6534 0.8836 0.5273 0.9372 0.8705 0.9123
order to produce a desired behavior and function. Fluctuations in the voltages
may cause alterations to the operation of the entire electronic system. For this
reason, various research has been made into the design and application of voltage
regulation for the purpose of maintaining the actual functionality of a specific cir-
cuit and the rest of the system. As tailored circuits run in expected environments,
the ideal operating point of a given system will change over time, thus the system
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will no longer be operating within optimal parameters. To alleviate this problem,
one must adjust the system to maintain its performance and functionality in an
optimal range (e.g. tuning the system). In other words, the purpose of tuning
a system is to customize its behavior in an optimal operation manner. The act
of tuning will most definitely add circuit overhead to the PCB, the design, and
the development of a given system. The advantage of this is that once the op-
eration of a circuit has been tuned within some threshold, this removes the need
for, and errors caused by, human interaction and environmental changes. The
adaptive methodology of tuning circuits allows for more robust systems. Pandey
et al. [74] examined several works making use of adaptive and self-tuning control
(STC) approaches for load-frequency control in power systems, showing their ef-
fectiveness in improving system performance. In 2015, research work was done [6]
to implement generalized frequency domain controller tuning for voltage sourced
converter (VSC) systems, showing that active variations in power can be damped
within tolerable levels.
4.6.2 Dynamic Voltage Feedback Tuning (DVFT) Design
To produce a new and more robust design of our primary TRNG circuit, we added
a few new elements to allow for self-calibrating design and improved functionality.
Our new TRNG circuit design removes the need for manually finding the ideal
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voltage and moreover, keeping it steady during operation, allowing for the system
to arrive at this voltage automatically using dynamic voltage tuning. Our design
solution is a feedback circuit that calibrates the voltage until we have reached
the optimal setting, as shown in Figure 4.7. Building upon the previous design,
Figure 4.4, our addition to the TRNG circuit is the Dynamic Voltage Feedback
Tuning (DVFT) which includes a buffer (B1), a precharged capacitor (C), and
a transistor (T1). The buffer, implemented through the use of an inverter, is
used to isolate the TRNG output from the feedback circuit. The capacitor serves
as a integral controller essentially summing up the past history of 1’s and 0’s.
Finally, the transistor serves as the mechanism to tune the voltage by varying the
effective resistance in the voltage divider. The advantage of this self-adjusting
system is that it can maintain itself within operation range. In other words, the
system is flexible enough to recover from fluctuation in voltage coming from the
power supply by attempting to prevent potential mistakes and malfunctions from
occurring. As shown in Figure 4.7 it is a very simple design that barely adds
overhead to the entire TRNG system.
To better understand the functionality of the proposed circuit, we need to
analyze the voltage and current flowing throughout the circuit model.
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Fig. 4.7: DVFT circuit model for the proposed TRNG.
DVFT Circuit Operation
As shown in Figure 4.7, p1 is the point that the input voltage is applied to the chain
of inverters. Depending on the variation of the input voltage at this point (p1)
the TRNG circuit will no longer function correctly. If the voltage Vp1 is higher or
less than VDD
2
, in our case 2.5V, the feedback tuning system (i.e. DVFT) should
be able to adjust for this change in voltage. If the Vp1 is not around
VDD
2
, the
power supply input drifts, there are two scenarios that occur at point p1 during
the operational lifetime of the circuit. We now examine the effects of these two
different cases with respect to the operation of the TRNG system:
i) Case1 (Vp1 >
VDD
2
): In this case, when the voltage at point p1 is higher
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than 2.5V, more zeros will be generated than ones at p2. This will translate to
more ones than zeros after the buffer at p3. Over time, more ones will gradually
raise the mean voltage at p3 and charge the capacitor (C) to a value more than
2.5V. This charging of the capacitor increases VGS (gate voltage of the transistor)
as well as the value of VDS (drain voltage of the transistor) which leads to an
adjustment in the value of p1.
At equilibrium, we expect that V (p1) = VDS = VGS =
Vdd
2
. Thus, the
transistor (T1) is working in saturation mode, because the drain-to-source voltage
(VDS) is greater than the gate-to-source voltage (VGS) minus the threshold voltage
(VT ) as follows:
VDS > VGS − VT (4.2)
Since T1 is in saturation mode then the value of the saturated drain current
(IDS) is given by the following equation:
IDST1 = βT1
(VGST1 − VT )2
2
(4.3)
where βT1 = µCox
WT1
LT1
.
If VGS has been affected by the charging or discharging of the capacitor,
then based on Equation 4.3, the value of IDS is also affected. In this case (Case1),
an increase in the value of VGS causes the value of IDS to also increase. As IDS
increases, the voltage drop across R1 increases, thus lowering the voltage at p1.
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The net effect is that the original increase in the voltage at p1 has been counter-
acted, and the system returns to equilibrium with the voltage at p1 returning to
VDD
2
.
ii) Case2 (Vp1 < 2.5V): In this case, when the voltage at point p1 is low,
more ones will be generated than zeros at p2. This will translate to more zeros
than ones after the buffer at p3. Over time, more ones will gradually lower the
mean voltage at p3 and discharge the capacitor (C) to a value more than 2.5V.
This discharging of the capacitor decreases VGS (gate voltage of the transistor) as
well as the value of VDS which leads to an adjustment in the value of p1. Similar
to the previous case, decreasing VGS decreases IDS which decreases the voltage
drop across R1 thus raising the voltage at p1 and eventually returning the system
to equilibrium.
DVFT Circuit - Capacitor Influence
In Figure 4.7, the capacitor (C) plays a key role in the overall operation of the
feedback loop (DVFT) in the TRNG circuit. This capacitor is precharged to 2.5V,
allowing it to maintain a fluctuation charge around the ideal voltage (2.5V) of the
input (p1) to the inverter chain, as shown in Figure 4.8. The size of the capacitor
determines how much time the feedback takes to react to changes in the voltage
at p1. More specifically, it reacts to the average number of 1’s and 0’s at p2.
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Fig. 4.8: Timing diagram of different points (p0, p1, p2, p3) of our model.
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In order to determine an ideal size of the capacitor in our design, we look
at the voltage and current levels of different parts of the DVFT design which is
shown in Figure 4.8.
The capacitor is discharged and charged through the buffer B1, and the
current, IB1 can be calculated as follows:
IB1 = C
dVc
dt
−→ dVc
dt
=
IB1
C
=
dVGST1
dt
(4.4)
where C is the capacitance of the capacitor and dVc is the change in the capacitance
voltage or also the the change in the gate-source voltage of the feedback transistor
T1 (dVGST1).
As mentioned earlier, T1 is in saturation mode and the derivative of the
saturated drain current is calculated based on Equation 4.3. Thus:
dIDST1
dVGST1
= kT1VGST1 (4.5)
Based on Equation 4.4 we know that
dVGST1
dt
= IB1
C
. Therefore:
dIDST1
dVGST1
dVGST1
dt
=
dIDST1
dVGST1
IB1
C
(4.6)
dIDST1
dt
= βT1VGST1
IB1
C
(4.7)
We also know that the voltage level at point p1 is:
Vp1 = VDD −RIDS −→ dVp1
dt
= −RdIDST1
dt
(4.8)
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We can then calculate dp
dt
which is the rate of change of the percentages of
1’s over time, using both dp
dVp1
and dVp1
dt
, because:
dp
dt
=
dp
dVp1
dVp1
dt
(4.9)
where dp
dVp1
will be calculated based on the slope of the graphs in Figure 4.6.
Putting Equations 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 together and substituting VGST1 =
VDD
2
, we
get:
dp
dt
= − dp
dVp1
R
C
βT1IB1
VDD
2
(4.10)
Using Eq. 4.10, we can derive the rate of change of the percentages of 1’s in
terms of the ratio, R
C
,and the sensitivity of the the 1’s percentage to changes in the
supply voltage ( dp
dVp1
). Thus, depending on how quickly we want the 1’s percentage
to react to changes in the supply voltage, we can select R and C appropriately.
In Section ”experimental”, we show an example of how to select these values.
Figure 4.8 represents our capacitor waveform model when introduced to
a discretized input voltage test pattern from a power supply. The purpose of
this figure is to show the functional operation response of different labeled points
(p0,p1,p2), ending with the capacitor(p3), as shown in Figure 4.7. The timing
diagrams for each of these points (p0,p1,p2,p3) are represented by Figure 4.8 (a),
(b), (c), and (d), respectively. We describe the timing and voltage behavior of
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these points as follows:
• Figure 4.8 (a) This graph shows an example voltage test pattern for running
this circuit, arriving in at point p0 from Figure 4.7. The important aspects
of this figure are related to the voltage fluctuation, represented by a change
in voltage from 5V to 5.2V (high voltage), or 4.8V (low voltage), and the
time slots noted by t1, t2, t3, t4, and t5.
• Figure 4.8 (b) This image represents the voltage present at point p1, from
Figure 4.7, which is the input voltage to the inverter chain. Because of the
voltage divider, one will notice that the voltage response range is from 2.4V
to 2.6V. Along the time boundaries (i.e. t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) the voltage response
is no longer discretized since the input capacitance to the first inverter, of
the inverter chain, causes a continuous behavior (charging/discharging) of
the voltage level around this point (p1).
• Point p2 is the point where our TRNG output (generated bitstreams) are
produced. As shown in the timing diagram Figure 4.8 (c), at the cases where
the supply voltage has the ideal value (5V) one can see that the generated
number of ‘1’s (2.6V) and ‘0’s (2.4V) are equal; these regions being: before
t1, t2 to t3, and t4 to t5. In the cases where the supply voltage fluctuates
above or below the ideal case, there is an bias induced causing an increase
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in the number of ‘0s’ produced (t1 to t2) or the number of ‘1’s generated (t3
to t4).
• Point p3 represents the capacitor’s (C) voltage level; initially precharged to
2.5V. The job of this capacitance is to regulate the voltage of the circuit
around 2.5V, as can be seen in time periods where there is equal generation
of ‘0’s and ‘1’s (Figure 4.8 (c)). The areas of interest are when there is a bias
in the generation of ‘0’s (emphasized by t1−1 and t1−2) or in the production
of ‘1’s (emphasized by t3−1 and t3−2). In these regions one can clearly see
the effect of the biases shown in Figure 4.8 (c) to the resulting waveform
in Figure 4.8 (d). Since there is a buffer (B1) between points p2 and p3,
the capacitor (C) charges in the presence of more ‘0’s being generated and
discharges when there is a bias towards ‘1’s.
4.6.3 Data Analysis and Results
While we have presented what appears to be a solid and effective hardware RNG
design, we can not stop our investigation of this schema purely on the theory
behind its operation. We proposed a TRNG model that is simple, lightweight,
and requires minimal additional area overhead. Now we need to examine the
operation of this device under different conditions (e.g. voltage changes, changing
current) to ensure that it remains robust and stable. One may be wondering: is
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this circuit reliable and efficient despite being simplistic? Are the bits generated
by this hardware RNG acceptable for use within critical designs? In this section we
will examine our TRNG design to determine its robust behavior and function. We
will begin by examining how the addition of the feedback loop aids self-adjusting
nature of our proposed TRNG circuit. We will then examine the effects of using a
programmed microcontroller (load) in order to see the effect of changing voltage
(to the input of the inverter chain) on the operation of our entire TRNG circuit
behavior. We will examine the generated output from the hardware RNG to
ensure that it meets the NIST Test standard and, lastly, examine other possible
avenues of producing bias in the generated output.
Feedback Loop Voltage Adjustment
As one can see from Figure 4.6, there is a clear advantage to including dynamic
voltage feedback tuning (DVFT) to our hardware RNG design. Each of these
graphs represent the use of different power supplies to introduce voltage into the
same hardware RNG model, where the x-axis represents the input voltage level
and the y-axis shows the percentage of ‘1’s generated in the output based on the
specific input voltage (Vin). With the blue dotted line (without implementation of
a feedback loop), one can see that the desired voltage of 2.5V is a difficult area to
maintain with minimal room for error during operation. However, the red dotted
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line (including a feedback loop) shows a clear plateau around 2.5V allowing for
optimal operation of our TRNG under a changing voltage. Figure 4.6 (b) shows
that when using the Agilent E3630A (bench power supply), the percentage of
‘1’s is approximately 20% when the input voltage is around 2.5V (in the case of
no-loop). However, in the case of with-loop, that same power supply manages
to maintain a percentage of ‘1’s around 50% for an area of 0.5V around 2.5V.
This greatly illustrates the advantageous behavior of including the DVFT to the
TRNG model. Furthermore, in Figure 4.6 (e), one can see that when using the
06TM1C Dell (laptop adapter; functioning at 19.5V) that while the percentage of
‘1’s produced at the output is near 50% at 2.5V (in the no-loop case), the margin
of error is extremely small in comparison to the with-loop condition.
As shown in Figure 4.9, the percentage swing of the tunability range is
approximately 20%. For sensitive circuitry this swing is appropriate as it would
become damaged before the DVFT loop would become affected. With circuitry
that can handle a larger swing (i.e. greater than 20%) then one solution would be
to add addition inverters to the DVFT. By providing more inverters, a larger range
is produced. Furthermore, one might notice that the percentages of responses are
different among power supplies because the properties of power supplies are not
identical that make them to react differently at various voltage levels. Note that
the divergence in resistance, conductance, and capacitance of each power source
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causes the difference in output.
Voltage Sweeping using Arduino Microcontroller
Here we examined the affect of replacing the input power supply voltage coming
into the inverter chain with an Arduino Uno that is already being used to take
readings from point p2 (shown in Figure 12). The purpose for implementing a
programmed Arduino is that it can add a load to the input of the inverter chain
while it is operating for reading the output of the TRNG circuit’s bitstreams. To
further cause fluctuation to the input voltage, a pull down resistor (Rpd) was added
to the circuitry to provide more voltage change. In this scenario, we observed
that the operation of our proposed feedback tuning circuit remains stable while
applying a variable load (Arduino) to its input. This validates our model’s use in
hardware RNG applications under variable input voltages.
Randomness Tests Results
In the previous writings, we have shown that the hardware RNG is capable of
adjusting to the voltage using our dynamic feedback tuning system. While this
aspect of the TRNG model is functioning, one must be sure that the output
generated by our model has enough unpredictability to allow its usage in crit-
ical applications such as cryptography, chaos theory, and key generation. We
must apply tests to evaluate the randomness of the data to ensure that the gen-
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Fig. 4.9: Voltage sweeping using Arduino as a variable load to the input.
erated output (bit sequences) can be implemented and applied to areas where
this random nature is a critical requirement. The NIST statistical test suite is
a suitable metric that can be used to investigate the degree of randomness for
generated binary sequences generated from a TRNG model. As mentioned in
Section ”namesection”, the important aspect of the NIST statistical test results
are the generated p-values. The results of NIST test for different power supplies
are shown in Table 4.3; indicating that each power supply successfully passed the
NIST tests.
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Table 4.3: NIST Statistical Tests Suite average p-value results of our proposed
TRNG model using feedback loop (DVFT) implemented with differ-
ent power supplies.
NIST Tests
p-value
MASTECH
HY3005F
p-value
Agilent E3630A
p-value
Agilent E3647A
p-value
CX305N-00 Dell
p-value
06TM1C Dell
p-value
USB
E238846
Frequency 0.7419 0.8772 0.6403 0.7954 0.8802 0.7346
Block Frequency 0.7691 0.4720 0.7309 0.5932 0.8604 0.7759
Runs 0.7360 0.7155 0.6803 0.8522 0.5192 0.8061
Longest Run 0.4370 0.6182 0.7509 0.8023 0.5003 0.8207
Cumulative Sums 0.8920 0.7305 0.9137 0.9025 0.9234 0.8113
Rank 0.6954 0.7305 0.7844 0.4970 0.8364 0.5513
FFT 0.8567 0.7419 0.8320 0.8023 0.6591 0.7865
Linear Complexity 0.9075 0.8910 0.7745 0.9411 0.7904 0.8608
Overlapping Template 0.6433 0.6850 0.5374 0.5782 0.7129 0.5553
Non Overlapping Template 0.6631 0.7105 0.6925 0.4063 0.8653 0.6163
Approximate Entropy 0.8740 0.7801 0.9362 0.9120 0.9544 0.8561
Universal Statistical Test 0.4173 0.6482 0.7305 0.6682 0.5492 0.4318
Random Excursions Variant 0.6281 0.5836 0.7015 0.6637 0.8630 0.9043
Random Excursions 0.8036 0.8137 0.7382 0.8390 0.7734 0.6204
Serial 0.9213 0.9473 0.8129 0.9552 0.9352 0.8941
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Bias Influences
Bias test is a check for potential operation influencing variables that can cause
the generated output of our design to become biased toward producing a greater
percentage of ‘0’s or ‘1’s. These influencing variables can come in a larger number
of forms, ranging from physical properties of the circuit elements, environmental
changes during normal operation, or even the affect of prolonged operation over a
large amount of time. When attempting to force bias into the system, we found
that our proposed model (DVFT) ensured the desired bitstream output (e.g. equal
number of ‘0’s and ‘1’s) even when being introduced to a variable load into the
inverter chain. Our belief is that the most influential effect on our TRNG model
is the introduction of a sweeping input voltage, which we were able to show could
be overcome by our DVFT loop.
4.6.4 Attacks and Defenses
Since TRNGs are widely spread within critical applications, their security and
trustworthiness must be validated to ensure their functionality has not been tam-
pered by adversaries. These components are of great interest to malicious parties
because if these single elements can be compromised with pseudo random behavior
then their output can be predicted in a deterministic manner. When dealing with
the attacking of our TRNG model, depending on how the circuit is implemented
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changes the potential attack surface. The two implementations are: on-chip and
off-chip design. Also, depending on how one implements these two solutions, the
attacks [67] performed could be categorized as invasive [112] or non-invasive [66].
Invasive attacks change the functionality of the TRNG by modifying the actual
circuit or design of the hardware RNG which leads to a permanent effect to the
entire TRNG system [65]. Non-invasive attacks are those that do not permanently
alter or deform the function of a TRNG. These types of attacks focused on in-
fluencing the input or environment in which a TRNG operates. We tackle theses
concerns in detail in the following subsections.
On-Chip Design
An on-chip design is where the entire TRNG circuit and power supply are part of a
single integrated circuit. This method has its own properties that can cause an IC
design to be more favorable while also introducing additional design complexities.
When creating an on-chip solution there are various aspects that one must con-
sider. Complex impedance profiles from 14 metal layers, complex workloads due
to other circuitry or applications running on the device, multi-frequency droops
due to IR, inductive, and capacitive properties. Furthermore there is the concern
that depending on the workload of other circuits, this could cause changes to the
power supply signal. One can overcome these aspects by adding overhead like
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guard-banding for a trade-off of additional overhead cost. This overhead causes
the the solution to no longer be lightweight. One might wonder what the po-
tential for a malicious individual to introduce power supply fluctuations into the
TRNG model. One method of addressing this problem would be to have another
circuit element to detect the presence of biasing in the output of our TRNG. It is
worth noting that at this point, since the power supply would be part of the IC,
performing a frequency injection attack [29] would classify as an invasive attack.
Another method involves moving the power supply off chip, however this intro-
duces easier access to tap the power line. One could have an isolated IC for the
TRNG circuit, which introduces the need for a dedicated power pin. The use of a
dedicated power pin makes the attack vector of signal injection easier to perform.
The use of this power pin does change the nature of a frequency injection attack
from being invasive to a non-invasive one. To overcome the power pin limitation,
one could use the output of the TRNG into a Line Feed Shift Register (LFSR)
as a seed for creating required random numbers. This would add another layer of
randomness because although one may modify the seed using the outside pin, the
physical variations of the chip itself would not allow one to be able to predict the
pattern.
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Off-Chip Design
An off-chip design is where all the components in our circuit, plus the power
supplies, are implemented on a PCB rather than in IC. Integrating the components
on PCB has different advantages and disadvantages relating to the implementation
and use of our TRNG model. This can allow for the lightweight nature of the
circuit; under the assumption that the PCB is secure and can not be tampered
with. If this assumption can not be made then the lightweight nature of the
off-chip solution raises new attack concerns. When creating an off-chip solution
the main concern is that it causes most attacks to go from being invasive (in the
on-chip model) to non-invasive and therefore easier to implement. One might be
concerned about the ability to perform a body effect or back gate attack that could
cause biasing of the TRNG model. Since the circuit is not as well protected, then
it would be easier to manipulate the regions of the transistor’s operation. The
purpose of the DVFT element is to remove this bias and allow for random output
from the circuit, even if it requires a single cycle. The greatest concern in creating
an off-chip solution is the increased access to the external power supply. This
attack vector is a prime candidate for performing frequency injection and altering
the output of the TRNG. As with the on-chip solution, one could integrate a
detection element to notice the presence of biasing in the output of the TRNG.
However this solution does generate greater overhead effecting the lightweight
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nature of our design.
In general, for both the on-chip and off-chip solutions temperature can also
effect operation of the DVFT. So long as the voltage stays within the specific range
of operation then temperature fluctuations are acceptable. Should the voltage
move outside of this range, then the DVFT will no longer work.
4.7 Implementation of Power Supply-noise based TRNG in Linux
Operating System
We also considered the construction of hardware and software implementation of
the True Random Number Generator (TRNG) that inputs data into the Linux
operating system. The hardware interface is to convert the input noise from power
supply into sequence of bits, which is then read by software. The software interface
connects with TRNG driver, Linux kernel and framework services to pass data
from TRNG driver to Linux kernel. The final testing consisted of NIST STS of
our implemented system. The testing consisted of measuring true randomness of
bits, before they are provided to the Linux OS. Based on our NIST test, if our
P-value is greater than 0.01 (minimum value), we can conclude that data is 99
percent random.
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4.7.1 Functionality of the Proposed TRNG Model in Linux
The feasibility of using power supply noise as a source of entropy is tested by
implementing the TRNG on an embedded Linux system and auditing the random
numbers that the TRNG driver supplies to the system PRNG. Power supply noise
is processed by attenuating it to produce a mean voltage equal to the transition
voltage of a logic inverter. This attenuated signal is supplied as an input to a chain
of inverters. Each inverter amplifies the power supply noise, eventually producing
a sequence of logic low and logic high signals. This sequence is sampled by a buffer
and this buffer is read by the TRNG driver. The random numbers produced by
the TRNG driver are audited using the NIST Statistical Test Suite. The results of
the NIST Statistical Test Suite show that the noise produced by a power supply
can be used as an entropy source for a random number generator implemented on
an embedded Linux system.
4.7.2 Experimental Setup
In order to fully optimize our system, selecting the best hardware and software
options by balancing performance and user friendly was absolutely necessary. The
first step of implementing the TRNG was to determine appropriate hardware to
run Linux on. Initial research suggested that a BeagleBone, a Xilinx Nexys 4
DRR FPGA, and a Raspberry Pi would be suitable to implement the TRNG on.
129
Hardware choices were compared by the maximum bit-rate an input pin could
be read by software, the amount of time required to get a Linux based operating
system running on the hardware, the cost to acquire the hardware, and the time
required to obtain the hardware.
4.7.3 Randomness Test
The NIST Test Suite is a statistical package consisting of 15 tests that were de-
veloped to test the randomness of (arbitrarily long) binary sequences produced by
either hardware or software based cryptographic random or pseudorandom num-
ber generators. These tests focus on a variety of different types of non-randomness
that could exist in a sequence. Note that the 15 tests are as follows: Frequency
Test, Block Frequency, Runs, Longest Run, Cumulative Sums, Rank, FFT, Lin-
ear Complexity, Overlapping Template, Non-overlapping Template, Approximate
Entropy, Universal Statistical Test, Random Excursions Variant, Random Ex-
cursions, and Serial. The results of NIST Statistical Test suite is presented in
Table 4.4.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a novel hardware RNG model that makes use of power
supply noise to generate random bit streams that can be applied in critical ap-
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Table 4.4: NIST Statistical Tests Suite Results
NIST Tests P-value Result
Frequency 0.213309 passed
Block Frequency 0.122325 passed
Runs 0.534146 passed
Longest Run 0.739918 passed
Cumulative Sums 0.376154 passed
Rank 0.534146 passed
FFT 0.739918 passed
Linear Complexity 0.122325 passed
Overlapping Template 0.534146 passed
Non Overlapping Template 0.502086 passed
Approximate Entropy 0.534146 passed
Universal Statistical Test 0.350485 passed
Random Excursions Variant 0.140647 passed
Random Excursions 0.159354 passed
Serial 0.122325 passed
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plications. This design is a lightweight solution using few electronic elements in
order to construct our TRNG circuit model, which adds a minimal amount of
area overhead to the entire system allowing it to be very simple in comparison
to other existing TRNGs. The proposed system also implements our new dy-
namic voltage feedback tuning (DVFT) circuitry to allow for robust and effective
behavior in the face of voltage and current fluctuations; creating self-adjusting
operation over time. Our results, based on experimenting with the use of six
different power supplies (three bench power supply, one computer power supply,
one laptop adapter, and one USB), show that our hardware RNG is capable of
regulating its operation under various conditions (e.g. sweeping voltage, current
changes). Our NIST results show that in each of these scenarios (e.g. different
power supplies) the TRNG model passed all 15 tests, which indicates that the
generated bit sequences are random. In future work, we intend to examine the
operation of this model under various additional environmental and operational
conditions, such as temperature variation and aging, to determine the ability and
robustness of our work in different circumstances.
Chapter 5
Hardware Security Architecture for the Internet of Things
(IoT)
5.1 Introduction
The Internet has drastically changed the way we live, moving interactions between
people at a virtual level in several contexts spanning from professional life to social
relationships. The origin of the Internet of Things (IoT) can be traced back to
the development of the Internet (interconnected network of computer networks).
IoT is a novel paradigm that is rapidly gaining ground in the scenario of modern
wireless telecommunications [7]. Another basic property of these things is push
button connectivity to the Internet or peer devices. IoT is comprised of a number
of technological protocols that aim to make up connections from one object to
other things and databases. The reason that one would to connect IoT devices is
to exchange information and monitor data which needs to be secured. The first
place where trust needs to be established in at the hardware level which is the
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platform that any software runs on top of. IoT still has many challenging issues
that need to be addressed and both technological as well as social knots that have
to be untied before the IoT idea becomes more widely accepted.
In this chapter, we examine the applications of hardware-based random
functions security primitives for the purpose of establishing trustworthy hardware
within any authentication framework. In order to do this, we evaluated two case
studies (Case Study 1 and Case Study 2) to determine the feasibility of our so-
lutions. Case Study 1 looks to provide authentication to an unknown number of
hardware platforms over an untrusted network in IoT healthcare domain. Case
Study 2 analyzes the possibility and cost of implementing our hardware security
primitives into an existing smart IoT device.
5.2 IoT Adoption and Expansion
The ‘Internet of Things’ and IoT devices have been on the rise as of late due to
a shift towards more ‘cloud-centric’ models of interconnected devices performing
actions or integrating with the everyday life of users. Over time the hype and
expectations of IoT technology have changed, but the overall desire to have a
more vibrant and interconnected ‘smart’ Internet still runs deep in the human
consciousness [32]. As one can see in the Figure 5.1 (Source: Gartner Inc. [58]),
the Internet of Things will continue to grow and develop, all while influencing
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Fig. 5.1: Gartner 2012 Hype Cycle of emerging technologies.
IoTs domain by providing new evolving data and the required computational re-
sources for allowing users and developers to create revolutionary applications [32].
With this expansion of use cases and implementations comes a requirement to
examine the security needs and specifications that can secure the new flux of in-
formation and data from prying eyes or malicious action. In order to best protect
this expanded adoption of IoT, our solution is to secure the IoT hardware using
hardware-based random functions.
5.3 Security and Privacy Challenges in IoT Systems
IoT is generally a large number of wireless devices that form a network. The
resulting ’Internet of Things’ is as powerful as it is susceptible to the same vul-
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nerabilities and security flaws as any computer system or distributed system of
computers. Securing any stored data, ensuring access control to sensitive or crit-
ical areas of function, encrypting communications channels and authenticating
new/connected devices are all aspects of IoT security that must be taken into
consideration when designing everything from a single IoT device to a distributed
network of IoT devices. Security considerations for IoT devices are the same as
those required for distributed systems or embedded devices. One must secure not
only the information being interacted with on an internal level, but also ensure
that any data/information exported by the device must maintain a level of security
assurance desired by the developer and user. We have focused on improving hard-
ware level security using hardware-based random functions primitives to establish
trust for users and devices. Work by West et al. [103] has taken an in-depth anal-
ysis of the complications and errors that occur when security is implemented in
fitness tracking IoT devices, along with a detailed postulation on how to suitably
implement security policies and principles in an all-encompassing method. The
similarity between our work and others in order to provide security and assurance
for hardware is that there is cost and overhead for implementing these solutions
and frameworks.
Common erroneous implementations of security lead to issues ranging from
denial of service vulnerabilities, falsification of data (both local and remote users),
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stealing or abuse of sensitive information, compromise of device integrity, or as
simple as incorrect handling of shared data leading to sensitive information being
leaked. A developer’s focus can be placed at a variety of abstractions, all with the
intention of making a device, or larger system, more secure and trustworthy. Be-
yond the security concerns, embedded systems have greater constraints in system
design then other computer systems. Being an embedded system, the nonsecurity
considerations boil down to power consumption, total PCB space, heat distribu-
tion, production costs, and component operation conditions. Depending on the
degree of security desired and the budget allotted for development of a device, the
overhead of incorporating security can become costly, thus making developers to
ignore improve security in their hardware platforms. All of these different aspects
play into the constraints and optimization of designing any secure embedded/IoT
device [5]. Our methods for securing IoT devices are focused on implementing
low-cost techniques in such a resource constrained devices (IoT devices).
5.4 From Hardware Security Primitives to the Internet of Things
Hardware security primitives are basic components or elements that can be used
to construct a more secure and sophisticated platform. They are used to pro-
vide security for a device using the physical properties (process variations) during
manufacturing and fabrication processes of the device. The advantage of using
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these security primitives is that they are very low-cost solutions in terms of cost
and overhead since they require minimal resources to function. As mentioned in
the previous chapters, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and True Number
Generators (RNGs) are two important hardware security primitives that could
provide a solution to securing hardware platforms that are used in IoT networks.
The reason that developers should protect the hardware is that physical attacks
are common since hardware attack is the first and easiest step. Furthermore, if an
adversary gains control of the hardware platform, then they will be able to access
any software running on the device. One way that this could manifest is if an IoT
device is using human characteristics (Biometrics) to authenticate users, then a
malicious actor that has control over hardware could see the sensitive data passing
through to the software. Our solution to this issue is to verify that the hardware
is not tampered using hardware security primitive methods, thus ensuring that
the human characteristics authentication is a trustable. Note that human char-
acteristics based identification and authentication has been proved to be unique
for each individual and can be used to authenticate users with a high degree of
accuracy. Since human characteristics based solutions are favorable for people to
uniquely identify themselves, this form of authentication is highly desirable for
IoT devices. Because people want to use their biometrics for authentication, one
can expect a large amount of adoption for this authentication method as the num-
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ber of IoT devices continues to grow. The reason one needs to protect hardware
is that any authentication solution, at some point, will be executed on top of a
hardware platform.
Therefore, two case studies that have been evaluated in this chapter examine
the high level use of hardware security primitives to securely authenticate IoT
systems using PUFs and biological signals.
5.5 Case Study 1: Our Proposed Architecture for Authentication in
IoT Healthcare Applications
One important application of the IoT is in the healthcare domain. There are
benefits provided by IoT technologies to the healthcare and the resulting appli-
cations can be grouped mostly into: tracking of objects and people (staff and
patients), identification and authentication of people, automatic data collection
and sensing [99]. The importance in establishing secure hardware platforms for
each IoT device in a monitoring network is that devices (e.g. Wearable IoT) need
to be verified because they might act maliciously based on counterfeiting hard-
ware. Furthermore, the user (patient) should be trusted within a network where
data is being exchanged.
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5.5.1 Infrastructure Security In Healthcare
In the Internet of Things in the health care domain, a patient will not necessarily
have to travel to see a doctor anymore. Since he or she can upload the collected vi-
tal signals from sensors to the cloud from smartphones, tablet computers, or home
remote controllers for a doctor or trained specialist, this data can be processed
by signal processing analysis, through the cloud systems in real time across large
sets of any patient supplied data. Moreover, by analyzing the patient’s vital sig-
nals in real time, one can use this analysis to help identify and predict unhealthy
biological signals like heart attacks for cardiovascular patients, etc.
Wearable devices are now at the heart of just about every discussion related
to the IoT; a hallmark of the Internet of Things and the most ubiquitous of its
implementations to date. Health and fitness oriented wearable devices that offer
biometric measurements such as heart rate, perspiration levels, muscle activity,
and even complex measurements like oxygen levels in the bloodstream are also
becoming available. As wearable IoT use grows and the number of biological
signals being recorded and processed increase, one needs to account for the security
and privacy concerns of the individuals using the wearable technology. Risks
include possible harm to the patient’s safety and health, loss of protected health
information and unauthorized access to devices and exploits of vulnerabilities.
Therefore, an authentication framework for IoT is a necessary requirement in any
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information system to ensure the availability of information to authorized users
only. The best way to ensure patient are correctly authenticated is through the
use of hardware-based random functions that provide unique identification and
verify trust throughout the network of wearable monitoring IoT devices.
5.5.2 Motivation and Challenges
IoT in healthcare can be used to create a home monitoring system for elderly care,
which allows doctors to monitor patients and the elderly in their homes, thereby
reducing hospitalization costs through early intervention and treatment. With a
system of this connectivity and size, there is a requirement of integrating security
and trust into the exchange of currently in-alterable information. Unfortunately,
IoT is extremely vulnerable to attacks for several reasons. First, physical attacks
to the unattended components are easy. Second, since most of the communications
are wireless, eavesdropping is extremely simple. Third, IoT components can not
implement complex schemes to support security since they are characterized by
limited resources and capabilities. This chapter presents a investigation of the
infrastructure of IoT devices in their application to authentication within the
healthcare domain. We investigate the issues of trust and trustworthiness within
an environment of unknown devices used by unknown individuals over potentially
unsecured networks in order to prevent the leaking of sensitive information of the
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patients.
5.5.3 Proposed Security Approach for Authentication in IoT
Healthcare
Figure 5.2 is a visual representation of the potential connectivity of IoT-based
ubiquitous healthcare devices. One will notice that at the center of this mapping
is a common cloud where these devices exchange information for the purpose of
storage, authentication, or for medical observation. As one can see, there are
varying solutions ranging from the type of protocols used to hardware solutions
that provide effective and efficient security and privacy. The authentication mech-
anisms typically are using passwords, smart cards, tokens, and biological signals
that are applied to reduce incidents harmful to patients including wrong drug,
dose, time and procedure. The biometric features of every human are discrimi-
natively identifiable, non-transferable, and non-reproducible, so why wouldn’t a
medical facility use these signals for identification? Especially since they are al-
ready collecting this same information from patients. Using wearable sensor nodes
for human monitoring has its own vulnerabilities since the devices may leak per-
sonal information [4]. One must address the limitations and security concerns
of the underlying hardware to be sure that both patients and staff are equally
protected from malicious, or erroneous, behavior.
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Fig. 5.2: A platform of IoT-based ubiquitous healthcare solutions using secure
hardware elements for Authentication.
Device Verification
The first step that a developer needs to take when designing a monitoring network
is to verify the hardware of devices in order to detect the presence of counterfeit
and malicious functions. Here, we examine the use of PUF for establishing device
verification through the use of hardware-based security primitives.
(1) PUF for IoT Applications: Counterfeit hardware is a problem that plagues
not only larger data mainframes, but also is equally dangerous in the embedded
systems market [14]. Generally the concerns center around security and how
to detect hardware Trojans or other malicious ‘motherboard’ behavior. Other
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concerns include the use of non-standard materials that can cause the fraudulent
devices to produce incorrect signals or readings during its operation. One method
of working around this would be to use already obtained ‘trusted’ devices already
obtained and alter their function to include security. We can use some of the
existing components in the wearable devices to make a security layer on top of
the system gathering signals from a patient. But as any security professional will
tell you, one can not plan for security as an afterthought. Therefore, there is a
need to authenticate that a given piece of hardware is ‘trustworthy’.
(1) PUF-based Authentication: Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are
one of the hardware solutions commonly used to authenticate with any given
device. Although there are various types of PUFs, we focus more on memory
based PUFs due to the availability of the memories in almost every embedded
device [40]. Memories inside the wearable devices can be used for authentication
purposes. The cost of including PUFs into existing hardware is relatively small.
This technology allows for low-cost authentication of embedded system elements
while generating volatile keys for cryptographic applications.
In our infrastructure any medical IoT devices used must first be registered
with the hospital (acting as the trusted party mentioned earlier). When a pa-
tient comes to purchase a medical IoT device from the hospital’s stores, they will
perform a device enrollment that will allow the hospital to associate the given
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device with the specific patient. Once finished with enrollment, the patient will
go home where they will activate their medical IoT system. This system will send
a PUF response to the hospital database that the hospital will verify to their
enrollment database. Once validated, the hospital will send an enabling signal
back to the patient’s medical IoT device allowing it to read their biological signal,
thus authenticating the device within the medical IoT network. The patient au-
thentication aspect will be described in the next section. With an expected use of
millions of healthcare IoT devices there is a clear need for being able to authenti-
cate these devices as trustworthy for healthcare related applications. Since these
devices will already have some memory along with individualistic deep-submicron
process variations, we propose that PUFs present a simple, low-cost solution for
providing a base trust for staff and patients using these IoT devices. Once one
trusts the operation of a given IoT device, it can be used for accurate reading of
biomedical modalities which can be used to authenticate individuals from a pool
of unknown users.
Patient Authentication
Healthcare applications are a very necessary part of our lives, providing the best
medicals facilities to people suffering from various diseases. Hence, it is necessary
for the hospitals to keep track of its day to day activities and the records of the
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Fig. 5.3: Security Approach for Low-Cost Verification of Devices and Patients in
the healthcare domain.
incoming patients. Monitoring patients remotely, collecting data and protecting
them from tampering is very crucial to address security and privacy concerns.
Although there are many benefits of healthcare application, there has always
been a threat of hackers getting access to the sensitive information of the pa-
tients that can make misuse of that information leading to problems. To reduce
preventative caution and impact level of the risk factor, we have investigated hu-
man characteristics-based authentication. human characteristics-based authenti-
cation/identification typically refers to utilizing interior and exterior physiological
characteristics of a person (e.g. EEG, ECG, PPG, PCG, iris, fingerprint). The
motivation for the extension of biosignal is in their potential uniqueness, univer-
sality, and their resistance to spoofing.
Electrocardiogram (ECG) signal not only is used for the purpose of diag-
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nosis and treatment, but also can be used for biometric authentication and key
generation [47]. Heart signals are one of the popular methods for use in authen-
tication systems. This solution has its own advantages in terms of cost, ease of
measurement and power. As shown in previous work [51], it is possible to use
heart signals to generate a key that can be used for authentication purposes.
The key generated from the ECG features was 727 bits in length, has an average
entropy of 0.9810, and passed all the 15 NIST statistical tests. Note that this
algorithm requires filtering, processing, and quantization of features as overhead
for generating an authentication key. Further details of the process can be found
in the previously cited paper. The authentication process requires an enrollment
of an individual’s ECG features into a database that can later be accessed to
positively identify a user. Due to the use of already collected heart signals, this
is a low-cost solution for dealing with authentication of unknown users within a
larger healthcare network.
(1) Human characteristics for IoT Applications: Biometric authentication,
identification and key generation systems have assumed increasing importance in
recent years. There are two types of human characteristics methods that can be
categorized into internal and external physiological traits of humans. Each of the
biometric modalities, including fingerprint based and iris based approaches, ex-
hibits particular strengths and weaknesses. Fingerprints are very popular due to
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their low-cost implementation and well-developed feature extraction approaches.
Iris identification is acclaimed for its high-level security, providing unique features
even for identical twins. Even though these kind of biosignals are common, they
are easy for attackers to access and are not robust against cloning. For instance,
our fingers are involved in many daily tasks such as touching keyboards and door-
knobs and can be easily replicated to bypass biometric systems. Iris systems
are susceptible to being spoofed by printed photos. They are also expensive to
implement.
In this chapter, we introduce the use of a new biometric modality known as
the electrocardiogram (ECG) signal. The ECG modality is permissible given that
it addresses the problems encountered by other biometric authentication research.
These heart signals can be found in virtually all living humans (Universality). The
authentication capabilities of ECG signals for circumscribed groups of individuals
has been shown (Uniqueness). ECG signals can be easily acquired using suitable
devices (Measureability). Electrocardiogram modality has been shown to per-
form accurately for subsets of the population (Performance) [71], [72]. The ”off
the-person” approach has made use of ECG signals acceptable (Acceptability),
and they are not easily spoofed as it depends on an internal body organ, the
heart (Circumvention). It also has inherent real-time signs of liveliness, making
it extremely difficult to steal and emulate a persons ECG signal.
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Electrocardiogram (ECG) [47], Phonocardiogram (PCG) [8], and Photo-
plethysmogram (PPG) [48] [50] are cardiovascular biometrics that are emerging
as interesting choices for biometric systems that are internal physiological signals.
Based on [47], bioelectrical signals recorded from the heart (electrocardiography,
ECG) are distinctive enough for each individual person to be used for biometric
applications, with the additional bonus of being inherently difficult, though not
impossible, to forge. Also, they can be measured using low cost devices. Unlike
other biometric systems, ECG signals can be monitored for prolonged periods of
time: for example to continuously authenticate the user of a protected device after
initial authentication. The Apple Watch applies the same principle of continuous
monitoring, requiring the user to authenticate their identity with a password when
the watch is strapped to their wrist, but then monitoring for constant heartbeat
to avoid the need for further authentication. As additional security, once there
is an interruption in the heartbeat detected by the watch, the watch locks itself
down.
(1) Biometric-based Authentication: Our solution for IoT is a system that
uses individual’s biosignals for authentication. Human characteristics based method
is a simple access control for an IoT healthcare device (wearable) that a person
can use any fitness tracking IoT device, such as ‘nymi’, to access. To do so, first,
all the subjects need to be enrolled. The enrollment phase contains biometric fea-
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ture extraction, feature selection and finally the information of the helper data;
as shown in Figure 5.4. The helper data contains the number of bits for each
feature that can be quantized, the parameters of the boundaries, margin and the
index of the features used for a given user. During authentication, an enrolled
user supplies an ECG signal to the biometric system. The signal is preprocessed
and features are extracted. The helper data is used to select the reliable features
and quantize them to form the key. The key can be used to authenticate the
individual by comparing it to a template. In a general case, the hardware require-
ments for a biometric authentication device would be the same, if not similar, to
that of any standard ‘smart’ authentication device. The generated key could be
stored in some temporary memory that could then be used for encryption or for
the creation of a generated user identification certificate. This information would
then be generated using the ECG data sent to the authenticating IoT device,
which in turn would use this information to perform access control. Our security
approach for authenticating only allows a system to operate when the correct bio-
metric is presented, thereby protecting it against unauthorized access, as shown
in Figure 5.4.
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Fig. 5.4: Schematic for key generation procedure.
5.5.4 Examining Security of our Architecture Model
An overview of our security approach is illustrated by Figure 5.3. This approach
is split up between a device verification step and a patient authentication step.
We show that initially there is a device verification step where the healthcare
IoT devices trust is established. Making use of existing memory on the IoT
device, a DRAM-based PUF challenge-response pair can be used to constitute
the trustworthiness of IoT operation. Should this verification fail then the device
can not be trusted and thus will not be used for reading biological signals. This
eliminates the concern that this IoT device would not operate as required in
healthcare service which is responsible to verify the IC. The authenticated IC can
151
then be used to read the biological signals and perform the necessary processing
to produce a bio-key. This bio-key is then enrolled to a local hospital allowing for
later authentication of a given patient to the medical staff. This step, of course,
requires encryption techniques. Note that the ECG could be used to generate
a session key for encryption of the data in transit. However this aspect of the
security approach is considered too broad for the scope of this chapter.
5.5.5 Case Study 2: Examination of using Human Characteristics
(Biometrics) for Authentication in a Smart DoorLock IoT
Device
In this case study, we move from examining the larger security framework pre-
sented in Case Study 1 to evaluating the cost and feasibility of implementing our
PUF and human characteristics based authentication scheme on top of existing
smart IoT device (Smart DoorLock). We have found that minimal additional
overhead and cost is required to implement our design.
Motivation and Challenges
The exponential growth in the number of connected smart devices, and the re-
sulting volumes of data, pose significant challenges for information security. Most
cryptographic primitives rely on the ability to generate, store and retrieve unique
keys. These cryptographic keys (unencrypted) are used as an input to the known
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encryption engine to generate encrypted output that is used to authenticate the
device or information. A shared cryptographic key enables strong authentication.
Candidate sources for creating such a shared key include biometrics and physically
unclonable function (PUF). However, maintaining large databases of PUF chal-
lenge response pairs and dealing with PUF errors makes it difficult to use PUFs
reliably [109]. The use of biometrics has been widely spread over the problems
of identification, authentication, and key generation [23], [93], [71], [10]. Most
of the biometric authentication research is suffering from issues of universality,
uniqueness, measurability, acceptability, and circumvention characteristics.
Architecture Hypothesis: IoT Device
As mentioned before, the concepts of an Internet of Biometric Things (IoBT)
can be used in a wide variety of embedded applications that are connected to
the Internet. Here, we specifically describe the architecture of an IoT device
(Kwikset Kevo Smart Door Lock) in detail to show that it is a very suitable
device (embedded system) to handle biometric authentication to become a more
secure and reliable system. As shown in Figure 5.5, a generalized architecture of
a ‘smart’ door lock consists of a microcontroller that contains a core processor,
memory as embedded storage and input/output peripherals. The user input comes
either from biometric readings (fingerprint, iris, ECG signals, etc) that are shown
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in Figure 5.5, digit codes for use with the keypad (passwords), or some other form
of wireless communication of data (e.g. Bluetooth, Zigbee, WiMax).
The lock mechanism is the common element of any door lock. The wireless
communication of the Kwikset door lock can vary depending on user needs. In one
variation of Kwikset’s smart door locks, it was found that the wireless communi-
cation module, as seen in the right half of Figure 5.5, used the Zigbee protocol
to interact with users. Another door lock variation replaced the Zigbee commu-
nication sub-module with a Bluetooth variation. The advantage of this modular
behavior is that regardless of the communication protocol used, a developer only
has to create a new sub-module rather than an entire PCB. This submodule con-
nects to the larger door lock PCB through a communication channel (serial, I2C,
etc.) that allows for exchange of data between the wireless antenna and a mixed
signal microprocessor. The processor itself contains embedded flash memory. This
separation of functional components and those responsible for ‘external communi-
cation’ shows the inherent design for resilience and adaptability as the needs and
requirements of the smart door lock change over time. The left half of Figure 5.5
shows a simplified diagram example of Kwikset’s door lock architecture and is
meant as an easy to follow guide for continuing our discussion on the advantages
of IoBT implementation [1].
Further investigation of the device’s hardware revealed that the Zigbee pro-
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tocol was used for communicating with the smart door lock device for an exchange
of a traditional password/PIN. Surprisingly, there was no acknowledgement mes-
sage sent back to the user interaction device confirming reception of the correct
password/PIN. Upon realizing that no confirmation response was being trans-
mitted by the smart door lock, we were able to determine that the authorized
password/PIN combinations were stored locally on the door lock using the em-
bedded storage. By no means is this the only implementation that can function
for a door lock device; it is equally possible to have the door lock communicate
with a remote database server for authentication or authorization needs. Through
our examination of a smart door lock’s architecture we have proposed that em-
bedded devices have the opportunity of being more secure even in applications
that are very crucial; home security devices, military applications, healthcare,
etc. This does not mean that the other embedded devices are not eligible being
used in IoBT concepts. As illustrated, although a subset of IoT devices may have
been more advantageously designed for alteration, the design space for embedded
real-time devices is vast and can easily be explored to produce a greater swath
of modular IoT peripherals. We foresee a larger user adaptation of biometric au-
thentication across a plethora of private and public sector implementations of IoT
methodology.
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Recent Attacks to IoT Devices
Throughout the adaptation and implementation of the IoT model over the past
few years there have been a string of recent attacks on IoT device authentica-
tion [97], [25], [96], [117], [30], [11]; for example, attacks on smart door locks. In
addition to this work, it has been shown that other forms of biometric authenti-
cation (e.g. fingerprint authentication) can be easily reproduced/replicated. For
these reasons, this work proposes a more effective and reliable method for imple-
menting biometric authentication using current, standard IoT devices.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a solution to the results of our investigation of the
infrastructure of IoT devices in their application to authentication within the
healthcare domain. Through our solution one would know that the information
produced from an IoT is trustworthy, that the individuals accessing information
can be properly identified, and that the exchange of sensitive biological signals
across a network is secure. Furthermore, we showed that the hardware-based so-
lutions that are presented in this chapter are low-cost and feasibly implementable
on existing resource constrained IoT systems (sensors, wearables, smart devices).
To lend weight to our solution, we also examined the use of a popular and grow-
ing authentication method (human characteristics based technique) to illustrate
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how hardware verification can improved upon an existing framework (e.g. Smart
DoorLock IoT device). The Internet has changed drastically the way we live,
moving interactions between people at a virtual level in several contexts span-
ning from the professional life to social relationships. The IoT has the potential
to add a new dimension to this process by enabling communications with and
among smart objects, thus leading to the vision of anytime, anywhere, anything
communications [7]. As the IoT continues to grow, we will need a strong method
for authenticating hardware. Our solutions present an effective, efficient, and
lightweight method for providing device verification in the complex environment
of the Internet of Things.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Security is a critical issue in modern information systems particularly hardware
security which has merged as one of the most serious challenges due to electronic
devices penetrating every aspect of our life. In general, hardware needs to be
protected since its insecurities can facilitate attacks on the programs and contents
running on it. Furthermore, manufacturing of integrated circuits (ICs) by poten-
tially untrusted foundries using possibly untrusted CAD tools or insecure reusable
components, and the need to protect the digital rights have raised the alarm for
protecting hardware [64]. Therefore, one must consider cost, power consump-
tion, performance, and reliability while designing/proposing methods for securing
physical hardware objects. Most present hardware security techniques use conven-
tional cryptographic protocols to provide security. In traditional cryptographic
protocols, secrecy is provided by trapdoor mathematical functions and digital
keys that make the protocols resilient to algorithmic attacks. Thus, hardware
security primitives are strong solutions in order to protect hardware component.
158
159
However, with the crucial need for information and data security, cryptography
has become more and more important. Cryptographic systems, in order to en-
sure their security guarantees, are highly dependent on the availability of a truly
random numbers. Random Number Generators (RNGs) have thus become an
indispensable primitive in security systems and applications. In this thesis, we
have presented several novel designs and architectures for hardware-based ran-
dom functions security primitives. The major contributions of the thesis will be
presented in this chapter.
6.1 DRAM-based Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical Unclonable functions are a very promising method as a hardware security
primitive. A PUF is an irreversible probabilistic function that produces a random
bit string. It is simple to implement but hard to predict and emulate. PUFs have
been widely proposed as security primitives to provide device identification and
authentication. In chapter 2, we proposed a novel dynamic memory based PUF
(DRAM PUF) for the authentication of electronic hardware systems. The DRAM
PUF relies on the fact that the capacitor in the DRAM initializes to random
values at startup time. Most PUF designs require custom circuits to convert
unique analog characteristics into digital bits but with using our method, no extra
circuitry is required to achieve a reliable 128 bit PUF. Our results showed that
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the proposed DRAM PUF provides a large number of input patterns (challenges)
when compared to other memory-based PUFs circuits such as Static RAM PUFs.
Our DRAM PUFs provided highly unique PUFs with a 0.4937 average inter-die
Hamming Distance. We also proposed an enrollment algorithm to achieve highly
reliable results to generate PUF Identifications for system level security. This
algorithm has been validated on real DRAMs with an experimental setup to test
different operating conditions.
6.2 DRAM-based Random Number Generations
Due to the need for highly secured electronic information systems, almost ev-
ery important and valuable document or piece of data is stored/transferred in
some type of encrypted form to prevent attackers from compromising privacy or
stealing information for nefarious uses. High entropy random numbers from phys-
ical sources are a critical component in authentication and encryption processes
within secure systems. Secure encryption is dependent on sources of truly ran-
dom numbers for generating keys, and there is a need for an on chip random
number generator to achieve adequate security. A TRNG is an important secu-
rity primitive used in a variety of applications including cryptographic algorithms,
communication systems, simulations, etc. It is critical to be able to produce out-
puts consisting of fully unpredictable and unbiased bits in a cost-effective manner.
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In chapter 3, we presented a robust hardware TRNG based on the Dynamic RAM
(DRAM) remanence effect, which is a condition whereby information remains in
a DRAM even after powering it down. The advantage of our hardware TRNG
is that it forms from existing components with no extra circuitry. We assessed
and tested the randomness of our proposed hardware TRNG by applying the
NIST Statistical Test which indicates the unpredictability and non-repeatability
of our data. Given its strong NIST results, we believe that there is a potential for
immediate cryptographic applications.
6.3 Power Supply Noise-based True Random Number Generations
Random numbers are used in virtually every form of encryption or data security
applications. TRNGs derive their randomness from a physical entropy source and
have been developed partly to enhance the security of PRNGs by providing seeds
that are inherently non-deterministic. TRNGs are central to many computing
applications, particularly in security domains such as cryptography. In chapter
4, we considered the design and implementation of a low-cost and lightweight
TRNG. In the interest of being thorough, we examined six different power supplies
in order to verify the non-cyclostationary behavior of the voltage sources. Our
novel TRNG model is based on power supply variations (noise behavior) and self-
adjusting operation. The benefits of this novel design are that: it is simple and
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easy to implement, there is little to no additional cost required to incorporate
the TRNG into existing circuitry, and the addition of Dynamic Voltage Feedback
Tuning (which we call DVFT) allows for feasibility and robustness of our model.
The cumulative affect of these benefits is the practicality of the entire power-
supply noise based TRNG system. We then validate the results of our theoretical
model and experimental setup to show that there is a high entropy rate based on
the findings from the NIST Statistical Test Suite. Based on our observations and
results, our DVFT power-supply noise based TRNG model has the potential to
be used in critical applications while also having the advantage of simplicity and
practicality.
6.4 Hardware Security Architectures for the Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a design implementation of embedded system de-
sign that connects a variety of devices, sensors, and physical objects to a larger
connected network (e.g. the Internet) which requires human-to-human or human-
to-computer interaction. While the IoT is expected to expand the users connec-
tivity and everyday convenience, there are serious security considerations that
come into account when using the IoT for distributed authentication. Chapter 5
examined the application of the Internet of Things within two case studies in the
healthcare domain and proposed architecture for existing IoT smart devices. In
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Case Study 1, our aim was to investigate the issues with the current method of
device and network authentication of IoT peripherals within healthcare. There-
fore, we proposed a low-cost solution to design concerns for the application of IoT
devices for authentication (device verification and patient authentication. In Case
Study 2, we examined the incorporation of human characteristic-based authenti-
cation to IoT design in order to evaluate the possibility of feasibility and cost of
this implementation in an existing IoT device (Smart DoorLock IoT device).
6.5 Future Work
While this thesis has demonstrated the potential of efficiently designing hardware-
based random functions, many opportunities for extending the scope of this thesis
remain. However, The research presented in this thesis seems to have raised more
questions that it has answered. There are several lines of research arising from
this work which should be pursued in near future. This section presents some of
these directions. The following ideas could be tested:
Firstly, we intend to investigate DRAM remanence on different memory
platforms. We have plan to consider different operating conditions (aging, tem-
perature and voltage) and their impact on our results. Different environmental
conditions have effect of the remanence time of different memory platform. We
eager to investigate these effects on the randomness of the bit strings.
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A second line of research, which follows from Chapter 5, is to implement our
authentication design models for the Internet of Things and embedded systems.
Finally, we have plan to work on investigating possible attacks on wearable
devices using Machine Learning (ML) techniques in order to help us find the
countermeasures.
6.6 Summary of Conclusions
This thesis is devoted to developing a series of designs and architectures based
on hardware random function to tackle the issues and vulnerabilities to hardware
objects, in order to protect them from malicious attacks, counterfeiting, reverse en-
gineering, etc. Our hardware-based random functions security primitives provide
low-cost, lightweight, efficient, and secure hardware platforms for the embedded
systems.
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